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Abstract 
I study the composition of international portfolios under collateral constraints and the 
implied cross-border transmission of shocks. I develop an international portfolio model 
with these features, in which leveraged investors seek diversification in both assets 
and secured liabilities and in which the pledgeable portion of assets adjusts to the 
state of the economy, reflecting borrowers’ credit risk. The new analytical results are 
as follows. First, agents choose endogenously how much to borrow from each 
country. Second, the collateral constraint, being a contractual link between secured 
and unsecured financial instruments, permits to compute portfolios without an 
arbitrage condition between those classes of assets. Finally, haircuts adjust 
endogenously through the change in the collateral values. After estimating the 
parameters governing this adjustment, I find that both portfolios and international 
transmission mechanism are quite sensitive to leveraged investors’ funding. As for 
portfolios, secured bonds have particularly effective hedging properties in managing 
the terms of trade risk. As for the international transmission, tightening haircuts affect 
the economic slowdown: initially severe contractions are followed by quick reversions 
to the long-term equilibrium. On a cumulative basis, these two effects compensate if 
haircuts adjust precisely to the economic state. But in case of uncertainty about this 
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Abstract
I study the composition of international portfolios under collateral constraints and the implied cross-
border transmission of shocks. I develop an international portfolio model with these features, in which
leveraged investors seek diversi￿cation in both assets and secured liabilities and in which the pledgeable
portion of assets adjusts to the state of the economy, re￿ ecting borrowers￿credit risk. The new analytical
results are as follows. First, agents choose endogenously how much to borrow from each country. Second,
the collateral constraint, being a contractual link between secured and unsecured ￿nancial instruments,
permits to compute portfolios without an arbitrage condition between those classes of assets. Finally,
haircuts adjust endogenously through the change in the collateral values. After estimating the parame-
ters governing this adjustment, I ￿nd that both portfolios and international transmission mechanism
are quite sensitive to leveraged investors￿funding. As for portfolios, secured bonds have particularly
e⁄ective hedging properties in managing the terms of trade risk. As for the international transmission,
tightening haircuts a⁄ect the economic slowdown: initially severe contractions are followed by quick
reversions to the long-term equilibrium. On a cumulative basis, these two e⁄ects compensate if haircuts
adjust precisely to the economic state. But in case of uncertainty about this adjustment, collateral
constraints are a source of risk which cannot be internationally diversi￿ed.
JEL classi￿cation: F32, F34, F41, G15.
Keywords: ￿nancial ￿ ows, borrowing limits, creditworthiness, risk premia, international business
cycle, macroeconomic interdependence.
1I am profoundly grateful to Cedric Tille for providing careful guidance throughout the entire development
of this project. I thank Rahul Mukerjee for his helpful advices on the implementation and interpretation of the




Especially over the last decade, ￿nancial integration has been increasingly characterized by the
international role of ￿nancial intermediaries. At the same time, intermediaries have pursued
a transformation of their trading model, which started at least in the nineties. One evident
outcome of the combination between these two processes is that the actual banking system relies
heavily on secured interbank transactions and is globally interconnected.
In this paper, I analyze the impact of these privately guaranteed transactions on the portfolio
strategies of internationally active ￿nancial intermediaries and their relevance in the size and
directions of capital ￿ ows. What we currently know is that the globalization in banking has
progressively modi￿ed the international transmission mechanism through both cross-country
transactions and foreign o¢ ces and subsidiaries (Goldberg, 2009; Goldberg and Cetorelli, 2010).
Leaving the case of multinational banks out of the analysis, I focus on cross-border international
interbank transactions, which are introduced in an international portfolio framework. In this
way, international traders face a broad portfolio choice which involves not only the asset side of
their balance-sheets, but also the liability side, which is made of collateralized bonds. In practice,
the trade in such types of bonds is a simpli￿ed and synthetic way to capture such real-world
wholesale funds as those involving repurchase agreements (repos) and asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCPs).
The use of collateral constraints in international portfolio models has been already explored
by Devereux and Yetman (2010) to formalize Krugman￿ s (2008) idea of an "international ￿nan-
cial multiplier", a label meant to capture the phase of global ￿nancial transmission that the
world economy experienced between the ￿rst and the second phase of the recent ￿nancial crisis.
Observing generalized deleveraging, Devereux and Yetman (2010) convincingly show that one
mechanism which can generate such a multiplier works through the collateral constraints faced
by leverage investors on their internationally diversi￿ed asset holdings. It follows that borrowing
at home and in the foreign country is set to react only in case of valuation e⁄ects on these assets.
While valuation e⁄ects on diversi￿ed collateral assets are surely central types of (transmission)
linkages, they cannot probably account for the entire mechanism at work. Although he was
inspired by the similar experiences of previous crises (e.g., LTCM, Russian Crisis, etc.), at the end
of his note Krugman (2008) made a strong call for authorities to recapitalize banks worldwide.
The emphasis on capital suggests two things: the international transmission linkages involve
the entire bank balance-sheet, and there was something new about the recent crisis. With a
focus on the liability side of international traders￿portfolio choice, here I ￿nd that the ￿nancial
linkages involve not only traded assets but also cross-border liabilities. More precisely, the size
2of the international transmission of shocks depends on both the international diversi￿cation
of collateral assets and the composition of the secured bond portfolio. I obtain this result
considering the mechanism proposed by Devereux and Yetman (2010) as the core modeling
structure and expanding the analysis in two fundamental directions: allowing active investors
to choose endogenously where to sell bonds (i.e., where to borrow); considering haircuts time-
varying, in accordance with the margin setting rules described by the ￿nancial literature.
Indeed, the use of wholesale funding has become pervasive among banks, and data suggest
that this practice is not con￿ned within the national borders but has an international dimension.
In this regard, the ideal would be to have a model where international bankers and brokers
choose endogenously not only their long positions but also their funding partners. Focusing on
funds that are granted against collateral, this type of model is a good candidate for providing
new insights on the role of interconnected banks in an integrated economy, where the possibility
to diversify idiosyncratic shocks may have knife hedge properties. On one side, there is the
well-known forced deleveraging of assets, which has in many historical events a⁄ected more than
one country. On the other, there is the innovation of ￿nancial intermediation, which spurs
￿nancial ￿ ows across countries. But this is a mixed blessing in that these ￿ ows may bring
about heightened international synchronization and, thus, more complex dynamics, for example,
reinforcing deleveraging should a shock a⁄ect the world economy.
I make a step toward this kind of model, but I de￿ne the interbank market in the simplest
possible way, maintaining the assumption originally made by Devereux and Yetman (2010) in
their framework. Speci￿cally, I only consider the funds supplied by saving institutions to lever-
aged institutions, neglecting the fact that many ￿nancial intermediary can be at the same time
borrowers as well as lenders1. Characterizing the interbank (i.e., intra-agents) relationships this
way and assuming that ￿nanciers in both countries are willing to lend cross-border, the contri-
butions of my approach are as follows. First, I endogenize the allocation of secured bonds across
countries, where the bonds are speci￿cally used as debt instruments. Second, I show analytically
(and con￿rm numerically) that the presence of collateral constraints insulates the portfolio choice
of unsecured assets from that involving secured ones (debt in this case), which thus means that
the existing portfolio solution methods2 do apply. Third, rewriting the collateral constraints in
terms of value-at-risk (VaR) limits, I can specify the dynamics of borrowers￿debt-to-asset ratios
as functions of state variables, through observed asset prices across borders. Finally, I estimate
the parameters governing these dynamics in a structural way, matching the empirical moments
1It follows that my model cannot capture the "gridlock risk" as de￿ned by Brunnermeier (2009).
2See Devereux and Sutherland (2011) and Tille and Van Wincoop (2010).
3with those generated by the model. Considering haircuts as unobservable, I use a simulated
method of moments (SMM) procedure.
The model reproduces both equity home bias and home funding bias (i.e., the tendency to
have liabilities tilted to the local economy). An investment shock breaks the perfect correlation
between agents￿capital income and their non-capital income (Coeudarcier et al., 2010). This is
the origin of the equity home bias. As for funding, the analysis of the portfolio choice shows that
funding depends on arbitraging the lending rates across countries. Therefore, short positions
with home bias tend to arise because of the hedging properties of bonds (as insurance against
terms of trade risk), even though these are secured by collateral.
Clearly, the fact that haircuts are adjusted in accordance with the prevailing economic state
does not a⁄ect the equilibrium portfolios. Indeed, what matters in the steady state is whether
the constraints are binding, and one can compute portfolios simply by adjusting the standard
portfolio choice in line with the collateral constraints. As far as the dynamics are concerned,
the adjustment in haircuts becomes crucial. Being a guarantee on loans, the pledge must be
adapted to the state-dependent counterparty risk, which is here limited to the sole borrower-
speci￿c credit risk component3. It is this adjustment in the pledge that drives the time variation
in haircuts. I ￿nd that when haircuts tighten in response to a drop in productivity, the variables
display a characteristic dynamics which is absent when the mechanism is not at work. Initially,
the contraction of model variables is more severe. Yet, afterwards the tightening in haircuts
brings about a correction which is due to the marked reduction in leveraged investors￿borrowing
capacity in the ￿rst periods after the shock. Basically, lenders start again to consider traders as
creditworthy and to lend to them only when they start to repay their debt.
The ￿ uctuations in haircuts can contribute to risk sharing, in the sense that if margins are set
accounting for the fact that borrowers hold a diversi￿ed portfolio of assets, then home and foreign
borrowers￿holdings of ￿nancial instruments show a tendency to converge. Unsurpraisingly, this
is especially true for debt-holdings. Yet, the model features the ampli￿cation typical of credit
constraints, no matter whether haircuts are constant or time-varying. Nevertheless, this is true
only if there is no uncertainty surrounding the revision of haircuts. If instead this revision is
subject to some sorts of shocks, the adjustment in haircuts can compensate some of the gains of
risk diversi￿cation. These shocks to haircuts are comparable to the ￿nancial shocks introduced
3At ￿rst sight this choice may sound unattractive, but in fact this is the most consistent assumption with the
problem I address in this paper: an analysis on cross-border funding, involving the liability side of balance sheets.
The alternative analysis concerns the other side of balance sheets and causes technical issues that represent a
topic in themselves. I discuss one possible way to deal with these alternative questions in another work (Trani,
2011).
4by Jermann and Quadrini (2011) while analyzing the causes of macroeconomic volatility. Here,
the shocks to haircuts can be interpreted as unexpected changes in credit risk, which cannot be
easily hedged through portfolio diversi￿cation.
In terms of the overall goal, these results can be summarized by saying that traders￿funding
strategies a⁄ects the ￿nancial linkages between integrated economies for two reasons. The ￿rst
concerns the fact that the country where to borrow short-term, wholesale resources is chosen
endogenously. The second reason is about the interaction between assets and liabilities because,
for one thing, all portfolios are solved under binding constraints, and for another, valuation
e⁄ects on assets spur the haircuts to react. Note that here I do not derive haircuts optimally,
and in general I do not want to provide a new theory for their behaviour. I just draw from
established theories to suggest one possible framework through which they change endogenously,
consistently with portfolio models where collateral is internationally diversi￿ed.
The structure of this paper is the following. In the ￿rst two sections, I present some evidence
on international banking (section 2) and describe how this paper relates with previous studies
(section 3). Section 4 is devoted to the model, and after I analyze the portfolio choice problem
(section 5 and appendix 9.1). In section 6 (and appendix 9.2), I describe my calibration and
estimation strategies. Numerical results on portfolios, economic dynamics and ampli￿cation are
in section 7. Section 8 is the concluding section.
2 Evidence: a brief look
The liability structure of the balance sheets of global banks is a crucial source of information for
understanding private capital ￿ ows and interconnectedness between countries: for example, the
currency composition and the maturity structure of funds a⁄ect the stability of both cross-border
claims and cross-border liabilities. In the BIS Quarterly Review released in March, McGuire and
Von Peter (2009) try to extract this type of information from the BIS Consolidated and Locational
Banking Statistics, breaking these data down by countries, currencies and counterparties (as a
proxy for maturities). Apart from their speci￿c focus on currency mismatches, they show that
the integration among markets for bonds and other debt securities has made a substantial step
forward. Yet, regions tend to take heterogeneous positions on the various segments of these
integrated markets. While major European banks are net borrowers with other institutions in
the interbank market and with the Central Bank, Japanese banks have been net borrowers on
the domestic retail market.
5In principle, interbank loans and securities are more exposed to the issues of asymmetric
information than households￿deposits. However, these issues are often overcome with a pledge,
which renders these wholesale deposits a cheap and quick source of funds, which have gained
popularity not only within the domestic borders, but also in the international markets. Using
BIS Locational Statistics, one can separate the amount of deposits that international banks have
vis-￿-vis the foreign banking sectors from the part owed to non-banks. The resulting dataset
cannot be broken down further by currencies, but it includes all interbank transactions made
"on a trust basis"4. That is, these data cature secured transactions such as ABCPs and repos.
Scaling by World GDP, I report these data in Figure 1, together with the total amount of foreign
claims held by global banks, which are considered as term of comparison. The sample is made of
OECD countries, which I broadly separate according to economic and ￿nancial similarities. Both
foreign interbank deposits and foreign claims have followed similar patterns, and the former are
quite as large as the latter. Since 2000, there has been a clear increase in cross-border claims
and interbank liabilities, con￿rming that globalization in ￿nancial intermediation has deepened
in the last decade (Goldberg, 2009). All amounts outstanding more than doubled in size, with
the only exception of foreign deposits held by European banks.
In terms of the model, I attempt to capture the close relationship between claims and inter-
bank deposits solving simultaneously the endogenous portfolio selection between assets and that
between secured liabilities. Furthermore, key structural features of these OECD countries shall
be used to parametrize the model for the quantitative analysis.
3 Literature
This paper is related with four strands of literature: 1) that on international transmission in
presence of constraints on portfolio choice; 2) that on the e⁄ects of the limits to borrowing on
asset prices and economic ￿ uctuations; 3) that on the type of (cross-border) hedging guaranteed
by di⁄erent asset classes; 4) that on ￿nancial intermediation, liquidity and related asset pricing.
In this section, I brie￿ y review some of this literature, without aiming at being comprehensive.
This paper is closest to the ￿rst strand of literature above, as I build a two-country portfolio
model with collateral constraints. A pioneering article on the role of portfolio constraints in
the international transmission of shocks is the one proposed by Pavlova and Rigobon (2008).
However, they work with constraints of a general form, and their speci￿c examples do not concern
the subject studied here. In fact, my model features a ￿nancial accelerator mechanism as it is
4BIS (2008), p. 5.
6the case of Dedola and Lombardo (2009) and Devereux and Yetman (2010). I actually build on
the latter, since they study the decisions taken by leveraged investors and I, similarly, focus on
loans secured by collateral.
Due to this focus on collateralized borrowing, my model shares some characteristics with the
studies on the macroeconomic e⁄ects of this type of borrowing. Aiyagari and Gertler (1999)
study how they a⁄ect asset prices, and Mendoza and Smith (2006) and Mendoza (2008, 2010)
use margin requirements to examine the e⁄ects of Sudden Stops on emerging open economies.
Iacoviello (2005) use a monetary model where entrepreneurs and households can pledge real
estate as collateral.
I take advantage of recent ￿ndings on the hedging properties of ￿nancial assets. Motivated
by the empirical relevance of the home equity bias puzzle (Sercu and VanpØe, 2007), Nicolas
Coeudarcier and his co-authors have recently searched for shocks that can reproduce this stylized
fact in a quantitative model. For this purpose, Coeudarcier et al. (2007) show what is the
necessary condition that the model economy needs to satisfy. In a successive paper, Coeudarcier
et al. (2010) show that one of such models is a framework with capital accumulation and trade in
bonds. However, the deepest analysis on the role of bonds in country portfolios is by Gourinchas
and Coeudarcier (2009).
Besides the portfolio models with credit constraints, my analysis is substantially in￿ uenced
by some works in the ￿nancial literature. Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton (2009) discuss the
economic instability that can originate from secured interbank loans. In these transactions,
collateral assets can be seen as risk-sensitive private guarantees needed to render marketable
otherwise non-marketable assets (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). The risk-sensitivity of assets
means that haircuts are time-varying. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) o⁄er an explanatory
theory of ￿ uctuating margins. A part of their argument is incorporated in the model below,
because collateral constraints amount to VaR limits (Adran and Shin, 2008) and haircuts can be
estimated by SMM - drawing from Du¢ e and Singleton (1993) and Michaelides and Ng (2000).
4 The model
Building on Devereux and Yetman (2010) - DY henceforth, I develop an open economy model
where leveraged agents diversify their secured liabilities as an endogenous solution of optimal
portfolio choice. The basic framework features two countries, two goods, two agents. The
countries are symmetric and populated by two groups of households. Active investors belong
to the ￿rst group and have dimension n; passive investors belong to the second group and have
7dimesion 1 ￿ n. The total size of the population is thus normalized to 1.
The heterogeneity between the two groups of agents is justi￿ed by their di⁄erent role in the
economy and is obtained through heterogeneous rates of time preference (Calstrom and Fuerst,
1997; Iacoviello, 2005). Active investors ￿nance ￿nal good ￿rms, buying their stocks with internal
resources and debt. Loans are granted by passive investors, whose role in the economy is that
of patient consumers and "residual" producers. However, due to an imperfect commitment to
repay, passive investors are willing to lend only against collateral. An integration between home
and foreign markets is possible because active investors engage in international ￿nancial trade;
they represent the unique group of households that has direct access to international markets as
well as domestic ones.
Within this framework, DY show that binding collateral constraints cause ￿nancial accelara-
tor dynamics, which propagates though balance sheet transmission. A scheme of the resulting
model is represented in Figure 2. The model below borrows this structure as the main building
block. The new features are meant to characterize the terms of collateralized borrowing. The
corresponding diagram is in Figure 3. DY follow Krugman (2008) closely and reproduce his inter-
national ￿nancial multiplier hypothesis, emphasizing the international diversi￿cation of assets in
which agents are long, while borrowing creates the basis for leverage. But, as Figure 2 shows, the
structure of loan covenants is not analyzed further, and the degree of bond market integration
is imposed, distinguishing between perfect bond market segmentation and perfect bond market
integration. In any case, the traded bond is homogeneous, as homogeneous are the production
technologies used in the two countries. On the other hand, loan covenants are of primary im-
portance here. As Figure 3 shows, the structure of the collateral limits can a⁄ect the integration
between ￿nancial markets, which is an endogenous outcome of the cross-border trade in bonds.
International diversi￿cation in secured bonds is a bit unusual for the international portfolio liter-
ature, in that bond holdings are generally fully endogenous to portfolio choice, while here there
is a contractual limit to satisfy5. The tightness of collateral constraints re￿ ects the international
￿nancial trade and can be linked ex post to portfolio choice. This sort of endogeneity of the
collateral constraint is not optimal but simply a consequence of the implicit value-at-risk (VaR)
rule, which governs the ￿ uctuations in borrowers￿creditworthiness.
The terminology used to identify the two groups of agents is largely borrowed from Adrian and
Shin (2009). Passive investors are non-leveraged institutional investors: pension funds, mutual
funds, insurance companies, investment trusts, etc. Active investors are leveraged institutional
investors (hedge funds and investment banks) and large commercial banks. Thus, in the model
5A discussion on how to solve for portfolios in this case is deferred to the next section.
8below, active investors supplement internal resources with wholesale funds only. In this case,
it is appropriate to talk about private loan guarantees (as opposed to public guarantees) and
an international intra-agents funding market (a modelling counterpart of a portion of the in-
ternational interbank transactions). In terms of Figure 3, this market involves both local bond
trade between heterogeneous agents and international bond trade between (homogeneous) active
investors.
4.1 Firms
Each country produces a traded good; traded goods are di⁄erentiated across countries. The
￿rms producing these goods are perfectly competitive public companies, and their objective is










t It￿1 ￿ wtl
￿
(1)
where i = H;F is a country-speci￿c subscript, P I
t is the price of investment goods, ￿A
t;t+￿ is
shareholders￿discount factor and l is a ￿xed amount of labour hours, under the assumption that
all agents in the economy supply the same equilibrium quantity of labour. When i = F, price
variables, P I
t ;wt, agents￿discount factor and investment expenditures, It￿1, carry a star "*".
Similar notation shall be adopted throughtout all the paper.
Production and capital accumulation in the two countries are as follows
YHt = At (KHt￿1)
￿ 11￿￿ ; YFt = A￿
t (KFt￿1)
￿ 11￿￿





t are productivity processes, Kit denotes the stock of capital available in country
i, ￿ is the capital share, l is normalized to 1, ￿ is the constant rate of depreciation and ￿t;￿￿
t
are investment shocks. These shocks are introduced following Greenwood et al. (1997), Fisher
(2006) and, for portfolio modeling, Coeudarcier et al. (2010)6.
Since goods are di⁄erentiated across countries, behind capital accumulation there is an in-
ternational allocation of investment expenditures. Using a standard CES aggregator featuring
6Note that here there is no need to specify the nature of the investment shocks. Speci￿cally, ￿t;￿￿
t do not
necessarily represent shocks to "investment-speci￿c" technologies, as the most of the literature - included the
papers I refer to - generally assumes. Justiniano et al. (2009) show that there is a distinction between the
"marginal e¢ ciency" e⁄ects of investment and its "investment-speci￿c" component. But this debate is outside
the scope of the present paper.



















































t and P ￿I
t are the corresponding investment de￿ ators, ￿I > 0:5 is the share of domestic
goods in total expenditures, and ￿I is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods. The assumption underlying the form of the investment de￿ ators is that the home good
is the numeraire and all the other prices are expressed in terms of it. In this sense, the relative
price of the foreign good, pFt, plays the role of the terms of trade. The law of one price (LOP)
holds for each individual good, but purchasing power parity (PPP) fails to be satis￿ed due to
home bias.














In equilibrium, this condition is satis￿ed because shareholders choose their optimal portfolio










The wage rate follows as a residual
wt = (1 ￿ ￿)YHt (5)
According to (4), investment is made out of retained earnings. On each date, this portion of














The e¢ ciency conditions for the foreign economy are analoguous to equations (4)-(6).
4.2 Menu of ￿nancial instruments
In addition to the two equities used to ￿nance the productive sector of the two countries, there
are two bonds used by agents for ￿nancial transactions between them. Speci￿cally, the asset
10structure consists of four instruments, as a bond and an equity claim are the basis of the ￿nancial
transactions taking place in each country and both instruments are internationally traded.
Equities in each country are claims on the stock of capital demanded by local ￿rms. The
aggregate stock is de￿ned as
KHt = n￿A
Ht ; KFt = n￿A
Ft (8)






Ft is the per-
capita total amount of traded shares. I interpret shareholding in a loose way involving not only
pure portfolio ￿ ows, but also the loans that productive ￿rms may receive from international
investors. The superscript A in (8), which has already appeared in (1), refers to active investors:
due to the assumed structure of ￿nancial intermediaries, active investors are the only household
category that owns productive ￿rms. However, even if passive investors do not have a direct
role in economic activity, they ￿nance active investors￿portfolio allocations. This intra-agents
funding link takes the form of bond-holdings, as passive investors purchase the debt securities
issued by the other group of households. Bonds are expressed in units of the local consumption
good, so there are an home good bond and a foreign good bond.
For convinience, I express all asset prices and payo⁄s in terms of the numeraire, the home
good. So in terms of the home good, equities are marketed at prices qe
Ht and qe
Ft, and their
dividend payments are, correspondingly, dHt and dFt. Then, by de￿nition, the rates of return on










The gross rates of interest paid by active investors are similarly de￿ned in terms of the home
good. Bonds are short-term contracts, according to which one unit of the local good purchased
at time t at the prevailing market prices, qb
Ht;qb









According to this de￿nition, the rate of interest prevailing in each country is riskless from the
viewpoint of the residents of that country.
4.3 Households
Each economy is populated by two groups of households, the active investors and the passive

















where the index h = A;P individuates the household reference group, 1=￿ is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption and ￿h
t is an endogenous discount factor without in-
ternalization. As usual, the endogeneous discount factor removes the unit root typical of open
economy models7, and its evolution is governed only by the consumption of the average agent in







h is just a preference parameter.
In spite of the common objective, the two groups have di⁄erent economic roles. Only active
investors ￿nance production and investment, but for this to be possible they need ￿nancial












4.3.1 Homogeneous intratemporal preferences
The heterogeneity between groups of agents concerns their rate of time preference but not pref-
erence for varieties. In this respect, all agents are alike and consume a given bundle of goods























































where ￿ > 0:5 is the share of domestic goods in total consumption expenditures featuring home
bias, and ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods. Note that, although consump-
tion and investment bundles are similar, ￿;￿ do not have to be necessarily equal to ￿I;￿I. As a
consequence, the consumer price indexes, Pt;P ￿
t , might di⁄er from the investment de￿ ators.
















A similar result is derived for foreign households as well.
7See Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2003).
124.3.2 Consumption smoothing: active investors
By assumption, active investors have some speci￿c capabilities as direct international traders.
They operate in all ￿nancial markets, in order to channel funds to pro￿table investments every-
where. In addition, I follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) closely and make a second assumption:
I assume that active investors￿ability to diversify savings across countries is inalienable (Hart
and Moore, 1995). This means that no one could replace active investors in supporting the
￿nal goods sectors should they deny their role as international direct investors. It follows that
they cannot precommit to pay back to their creditors, the group of passive investors. Concerned
by this, lenders are willing to lend only in presence of some sort of guarantee on the future
repayment. In absence of any explicit public guarantees, debt guarantees are supplied by the
borrowers themselves, securing (short-term) loans with collateral.
The ￿rst assumption implies that active investors take positions in both bonds and equities




























Ft denote bond holdings and kA
Ht and kA
Ft are equity holdings. Foreign household￿ s
budget constraint is analoguous to (14). Following DY, I have attached opposite signs to bonds
and equities as if investors distinguish between assets according to whether their position in these
assets is long or short. I keep this distinction for convenience: it allows me refer to bonds as
either liabilities or debt instruments, whenever the word "asset" can render their role obscure.
The second assumption introduces a second constraint, a collateral requirement with an ex-
ante-like form8. As in DY, the collateral consists of the mark-to-market value of borrowers￿equity
holdings, given the speci￿c debt-to-asset ratios ￿t;￿￿
t of home and foreign agents, respectively.
Expanding the resulting collateral constraint just to allow for the possibility of diversi￿ed short



























Due to assumption (11) on time preferences, the constraints in (15) will be binding for sure even
in the steady state of the model, and borrowers will never accumulate so much as to invalidate
their debt limits (Iacoviello, 2005).
The collateral constraints in (15) presents two new features. The ￿rst innovation is that the
value of the collateral constrains borrowing regardless of the origin of the funds. Active investors
8See Mendoza and Smith (2006) and Mendoza (2010).
13can diversify not only their assets but also their liabilities. Yet, their total borrowing (on the
LHS) cannot be greater than a share of all their gross assets, which are given by the value of
all their equity portfolio. The second innovation concerns the debt-to-asset ratios themselves: ￿t
and ￿￿
t are assumed to be both borrower-speci￿c and time-varying.
Each of these two extensions has important implications. The ￿rst extension introduces an
endogenous portfolio choice in line with the literature on international portfolios. Active investors
can choose how much to borrow locally and how much to borrow in the foreign country. This
diversi￿cation of debt translates into bond shares sold in the home and in the foreign country.
Technically, these shares are pinned down by the structure of the model because the two bonds
are linearly related under the same pledge9.
The second extension amounts to an interpretation of ￿t and ￿￿
t in terms of time-varying
credit risk. Being borrower-speci￿c, a debt-to.asset ratio measures the creditworthiness of the
borrowers it refers to. Here, creditworthiness has a restrictive meaning: it is all the counterparty
risk which remains after stripping out the riskiness of the assets pledged as collateral (commodity
risk). Credit risk ￿ uctuates through time in accordance with a standard risk management rule,
which can be easily recovered from (15). Adding the total value of equity holdings on both sides























t are home and foreign agents￿net ￿nancial wealth10 and mt;m￿
t are time-varying
haircuts, whose de￿nition is mt = 1 ￿ ￿t, for home borrowers, and m￿
t = 1 ￿ ￿￿
t, for foreign
borrowers. This de￿nition reminds of the very clear one stated by Gorton (2009, p. 31): "the
haircut is the percentage di⁄erence between the market value of the pledged collateral and the
amount of funds lent".
The time-variation in the margins is a consequence of the private guarantees. The only reason
why active investors are charged a risk-free rate on each type of bond they issue (equations (10)
and (14)) is that they secure the transaction pledging their net asset portfolio as in (15￿ ). As
9Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) adopt an alternative approach, in which home and foreign borrowing depend
on the share of collateral pledged to, respectively, home and foreign agents, under the assumption that the latter
pay higher liquidation costs than the former.
10For example, given the buget constraint in (14), home country traders￿net worth can be written as follows:
PtcA
t + WA























14Gorton and Pennacchi (1990, 1995) suggest, active investors are international ￿nancial traders
because of their ability to produce some new assets, the secured bonds. However, these assets
may have some unpleasant properties if the seller uses them to discharge part of the risk it faces.
Note that the implicit assumption in (15) is that the collateral is not constituted by formely
owned assets but by the same equities international traders buy today. Put it di⁄erently, the
￿ ow of capital income feeding W A
t ;W ￿A
t is exposed to productivity and investment shocks - and
active investors￿wage income follows the cycles of aggregate production. It follows that bHt;bFt
can be sold as risk-free bonds in terms of the good produced in the corresponding market only if
the private guarantee is made risk-sensitive. In this way, the haircuts can adjust in accordance
with the changes in borrowers￿creditworthiness, which is state-dependent. Formally, the model
can capture a variation in mt;m￿
t only through a variation in ￿t;￿￿
t, which determine the size of
the pledge through the size of the loan granted by lenders. mt;m￿
t, on one side, and ￿t;￿￿
t, on the
other, are perfectly negatively correlated. As the latter increase, haircuts can correspondingly
decrease, the reason being that ￿nanciers become less concerned about credit risk and reduce
their request for guarantees against unexpected losses. This type of mechanism is implicit in
(15￿ ) and restricts the possibility of unexpected shocks to future ￿nancial wealth. Adapting the
margin setting behaviour formalized by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) to equation (15￿ ), I
















where & is a given con￿dence level and V A
kt+1;V ￿A
kt+1 denote the unitary market value of active
investors￿equity portfolio (capital holdings). Once ￿nanciers have accounted for this risk prop-
erly, the probability that borrowers su⁄er from an unpredicted negative valuation e⁄ect on their
overall equity portfolio must be very small: equal to &: The negative sign is used to characterize
the unfavourable state of the world.
Note, however, that there is a slight contrast between this result and what is usually done in
practice. While usually the constraint on borrowers￿net worth arises from all their long and short
￿nancial positions, in (15￿ )-(16) these positions are somewhat aggregated in a unique measure.
More precisely, there is no speci￿c margin on either home shares or foreign shares but an overall
haircut mt or m￿
t. It follows that mt and m￿
t are set on a purely relational basis, which means that
haircuts represent agent-speci￿c characteristics, depending on the country of origin. In contrast,
the riskiness of collateral does not show up explicitly.
Although this is a quite strong feature of this model, there are two reasons for maintaining
it. The ￿rst is that the prevailing approach in macroeconomics is to consider just one collateral
instrument, most likely assuming that this is a synthetic measure for the entire collateral pledged.
15This is the same approach chosen by DY, who clearly could not use a synthetic collateral asset
in a portfolio paper where collateral comes from internationally diversi￿ed assets. From this
viewpoint, I follow them and apply the same logic. Second, it is rightly this approach that gives
the possibility to focus on creditworthiness alone, as I can easily isolate its determinants and
e⁄ects11.
As far as the determinants of credit risk are concerned, the risk-pro￿le of borrowers re￿ ect
their portfolio choice: keeping everything else equal, one would expect that borrowers with more
diversi￿ed portfolios are also less exposed to a given idiosyncratic shock. The guarantees on




























where ￿Ht;￿Ft measure the size of the loans granted against each unit of home and foreign
equities, respectively. The weights in (17) are, ￿rst, the portfolio share of home country equities
and, second, the share of foreign country equity. Other real-world determinants which do not ￿t
the de￿nition of borrower￿ s creditworthiness used in the present model, so I shall neglect them.
As usual, the optimality conditions for active investors￿choice of bond and equity holdings




















































































where ￿t is the lagrange multiplier attached to the collateral constraint. The consumption Euler
equations of the foreign active investor are alike.
4.3.3 Consumption smoothing: passive investors
Passive investors are not leveraged and actually supply accumulated savings to active investors.
In my interpretation, "passive" means that these investors do not take direct positions in pro-
ductive ￿rms, yet they do it funding active investors￿portfolio strategies. In this sense, it is the
11For an alternative approach, see Trani (2011).
16functioning of the intra-investors market that generates the necessary resources needed for pro-
duction and investment by ￿nal good ￿rms. To accomodate this interpretation in the framework
developed by DY, I allow passive investors in any country to buy the bonds issued by both local
and foreign international traders. For the rest, I follow DY in assuming that, in terms of the
aggregate economy, passive investors conduct some residual activity.
I model passive investors￿cross-border loans in a very simple way, which is however consistent
with margin constraints, in general, and with the state-dependency of margins assumed above,
in particular. I assume that passive investors fund both local and foreign traders, but they lend
only in terms of the domestic good. In other words, lenders aim is to remain safe at each point
in time, so they lend at the local interest rate given by (10) and adjust the haircuts in line with
borrowers￿credit risk, as in (16).
The implication is that there are two separate bond markets for active investors￿liabilities: an
home market and a foreign market. However, the two markets are ￿nancially integrated because
active investors meet on international markets to transact not only equities, but also secured
bonds. In this sense, the portfolio choice problem is limited to one group of agents, and it is this
group of agents that decide whether to borrow at home or abroad. Financiers in each market
are passive with respect to the portfolio choice, and the security that they receive as a result of








where the star indicate that the claim is owned against foreign active investors.
The residual activity of passive investors is to produce output in the backyard sector, absorb-
ing a small portion of the total stock of capital available in the economy. The production function








￿￿, in the foreign economy. These
technologies are characterized by ￿xed productivity z and decreasing returns to scale, ￿ < 1.
Passive investors are the unique owners of the stock of capital used in the backyard sector, which
does not contribute to production and investment in the ￿nal good sector. Finally, the backyard
sector is a rather peculiar non-traded good sector: its output is completely consumed inside the
sector. That is, ￿nal and backyard good are perfect substitute in passive investors￿consumption.























































Home agents maximize under (22), so that their bond and equity holdings must satisfy,













































Foreign passive investors￿consumption Euler equations are analogous.
4.3.4 Funding, risk premia and margins
The ￿rst order conditions (18)-(21) express active investors￿supply of bonds and demand for
equities. The ￿rst order conditions (24)-(25) express passive investors￿demand for bonds and
for (residual) capital. The optimality conditions of foreign agents have analogous implications.
Taken together, all these equations determine the equilibrium asset prices. Since active investors
borrow at a margin, equilibrium prices embed two characteristic types of risk premia.
The ￿rst characteristic premium is the cost of the debt guarantee, the guarantee premium
(GP). Since the purpose of intra-investors loans is to provide short-term, cheap funds to interna-
tional traders, the fundamental price of bonds is determined by passive investors￿Euler equations
- speci￿cally, (24) and its foreign counterpart:
EtRHt+1 = 1
Et￿P

















t, for h = A;P. On the other hand, active investors use these
riskless liabilities to invest in risky assets. To bridge this mismatch, they pledge collateral, whose






































t+1. This term has been called in various ways12;
I use the new label GP for it seems to ￿t well the economic context I refer to. The GP is a sort of
insurance premium that international traders must pay on each unit of borrowed good, so what
they eventually receive from lenders is less than one unit of a loan. Being a ratio between two
lagrange multipliers, the GP implies that active investors who issue secured debt internalize the
12For alternative de￿nitions, see Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Mendoza (2010).
18shadow cost of the guarantee in terms of consumption. Clearly, when borrowing from foreign
lenders, home investors take into account the exhange rate risk, given by the comovements
between the pricing kernel and the terms of trade (second and third terms in the bottom equation
in (26)).
The second premium does not characterize intra-investors transactions but the use of the
resources generated by these transactions to ￿nance ￿nal good ￿rms. This risk premium is the
equity premium (EP). Combining (20)-(21) with (18)-(19) and writing in compact form, I obtain
the following EP:















with i;j = H;F. When i = j, equities issued in one country pay a premium over secured
liabilities sold in the same country; otherwise, the premium links borrowing in one country to
investment in another country. Given (27), the EP is split into two components (Mendoza and
Smith, 2006). In line with the de￿nition of the funding premium as GP, the ￿rst component is





￿￿￿: the marginal value of an additional unit of borrowing, ￿t, is
limited by the size of the haircut. The novelty here is that, given (16), mt is state-dependent,
introducing considerations on the perception of active investors￿creditworthiness. The second
component is the traditional comovement between pricing kernel and the return di⁄erential
between yields on assets and rates on liabilities.
The two types of risk premia de￿ned in (26)-(27) can be analogously derived from foreign
active investors￿e¢ ciency conditions, considering that in the latter case case the movements in
the terms of trade have an opposite e⁄ect to the one above. More important is to note that
the risk-sensitivity of the haircut does have not only a quantity e⁄ect (the tightness of (15) and
(15￿ )), but also a price e⁄ect through the insurance component of the equity premium. As (27)
shows, the pricing e⁄ect is directly consequential to the quantity e⁄ect: the insurance component
of the EP gets smaller, the tighter the collateral constraint. Yet, (16) implies that the tightness of
the constraint is not due to the quantity of assets but to their market valuation. The underlying
mechanism is in fact the margin setting rule followed by ￿nanciers.
My approach to model margin setting is the following. I do not attempt to derive optimal
margins, but I consider them as implied by the VaR constraint (15￿ ). This is the same perspective
used to write down (16), but this equation cannot work as a margin setting rule. Without knowing
active investors￿portfolio shares, it is not possible to unambigously determine ￿t;￿￿
t. In fact,
the precise argument made by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) is that haircuts are computed
19by ￿nanciers on individual positions. I simplify their argument, which accounts for the role
of ￿nanciers￿information about shocks and fundamentals. In fact, Brunnermeier and Pedersen
show that, conditional on their information set and on the chosen quantile of the distribution of
future payo⁄s, ￿nanciers set the margin in such a way that it can re￿ ect either the fundamental
volatility or the volatility of observed prices. Since the implications of such a result are outside









Here, passive investors￿information does not have any role, although at the end I shall allow for
an exogenous shock in the determination of the haircuts.
In general, rules like this one can be solved standardizing the random variable mit and in-
verting the relevant distribution function. With a general equilibrium perspective, here this
distribution results from the combination between the exogenous states and the structure of
the economy. Moreover, since (28) is forward-looking but not optimally derived, it cannot be
imposed straightaway without problems in the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition needed to
￿nd the reduced form of the model. To take these two considerations into account, I exploit the









0 (￿) > 0 (28￿ )
The functional relation f (￿) depends on un-modelled aspects like, for instance, the relevant
quantile of the distribution of prices. An interpretation for (28￿ ) is as follows: if the market value
of asset i grows over time, borrowers can obtain more debt against each unit of i. Its haircut
turns out to be correspondingly lower.
Expectations play a role in (28￿ ) because time t equilibrium price qe
it must satisfy agents￿
Euler equations. From this viewpoint, the heterogeneity between the borrowers and lenders
means that the margin setting rule must account for distorted (equity) prices as well as for the
di⁄erent pricing kernels between household-types. Taking a simple weighted average of (20) and









































20The equilibrium price is biased downward (Aiyagari and Gertler, 1999) because active investors￿
discount factor internalizes the shadow cost of secured debt, ￿
A
t;t+1, and because the backyard
sector is less productive than the ￿nal good sector, ￿ < 1. More importantly, (29) shows that
the equilibrium asset price must be coherent with the expectations (the horizon) of each group
of agents as well as with the dicounted return from future economic activity in both productive
sectors. Conceptually, this result resembles the one obtained by Geanakoplos (2009), although
(29) is in no way comparable with his extensive analysis on the determination of haircuts in
general equilibrium. According to him, secured borrowing can be characterized ex ante as an
indexed stream of contracts, as in an Arrow-Debreu setup. However, in equilibrium only one con-
tract is observable, the one aligning the views of borrowers and lenders, who have heterogeneous
preferences (optimistic versus pessimistic beliefs) regarding the traded assets. One of the main
elements of his analysis that are missing here is the fact that I assume that active and passive
investors are both equal to a given fraction of total population, while the distinction between
natural buyers and sellers is endogenous in his case.
Finally, (28￿ ) can be plugged back into (17) in order to derive a simple but endogenous rule
for ￿t;￿￿



























and a similar relation can be written for the foreign country. In order to reconcile this result with
the portfolio choice problem, I take an empirical approach, as the model is a candidate framework
to estimate haircuts in a structural manner, under the solution for endogenous portfolios. Hence,
invoking symmetry, I approximate the last equation and its foreign counterpart with a simple
linear speci￿cation:








Ft￿1 + ￿ m
￿ ￿ ￿￿t ; ￿￿








Ft￿1 + ￿ m
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿t (30)
where ￿￿t;￿￿￿t are exogenous innovations. These innovations can be alternatively interpreted as
pure shocks or as approximation errors, and ￿ m=￿ ￿ is a scaling factor.  ; 
￿ re￿ ect the symmetry
between the two economies and are a⁄ected by the cross-border ownership of productive capital.
The e⁄ect of symmetry cannot be easily removed, as it has been initially imposed by construction.
The e⁄ect of diversi￿ed equity portfolios can instead be purged out as soon as optimal portfolios
are recovered from the model solution.
As a ￿nal remark, the scaling factor ￿ m=￿ ￿ represents the inverse of active investors￿debt-
to-capital ratio in the steady state. Technically, this scaling is needed to transform a given
shock to ￿t or ￿￿
t into a unit impulse in the corresponding haircut (mt or m￿
t). Haircuts are the
21variables of interest as it is the ultimate adjustment in haircuts that satis￿es (15￿ ). It is thus
important that a unit impulse in ￿t or ￿￿
t leads to a unit impulse in haircuts, rendering a shock
to haircuts comparable to all the other (more standard) shocks. Intuitively, this technical point
can be explained as follows. The debt-to-asset ratio ￿t (￿￿
t) arises from stock variables expressed
in gross terms, but the VaR restricts agents￿capital, that is, their net ￿nancial assets. Due to
the practice of borrowing against the same equities for which the loan is demanded (equations
(15)), collateralization drives an important wedge between gross and net ￿gures. This wedge is
leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2008), which is captured by ￿ m=￿ ￿. In any case, this scaling factor
will not a⁄ect the analysis until the very last section of the paper (section 8), where I shall come
back to it.
4.4 Competitive equilibrium
























Ft) and of a vector of prices (Pt, P ￿
t , P I
t , P I￿









dFt) such that: a) ￿rms in both countries maximize pro￿ts; b) active investors in both countries
maximize lifetime utility subject to their budget and collateral constraints; c) passive investors
in both countries maximize lifetime utility subject to their budget constraints; d) the clearing
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+ (1 ￿ n)BP
Ft = 0 (33)
n￿A
Ht + (1 ￿ n)kP
Ht = 1 ; n￿A
Ft + (1 ￿ n)kP
Ft = 1 (34)
5 Portfolio choice: the case of secured liabilities
In the model, the solution for international portfolios depends on the endogenous choice of active
investors. Passive investors invest only in domestic capital and issue loans expressed in terms of
the local good. In this way, the terms of trade risk is entirely borne by borrowers, who are as
well concerned about the variation in their credit risk because margins are adjusted accordingly.
Active investors￿cross border holdings involve both equities and secured bonds.
22However, since collateral constraints generate risk premia such as those de￿ned in (26) and
(27), setting up the asset allocation problem on the basis of the usual arbitrage conditions presents
some di¢ culties. The usual approach to constructing portfolio Euler equations is to take one
asset as the reference and to compare it with all the other assets. In this model, there are four
￿nancial instruments: two standard assets (equities) and two constrained assets (secured bonds).
Considering the foreign equity as the reference asset, the standard approach suggests to combine


















t+1 (RFt+1 ￿ rFt+1) + ￿tmt = 0 (36)
Et￿
A
t+1 (rHt+1 ￿ rFt+1) = 0 (37)
Apart from (37), the ￿rst two portfolio selection conditions are more complex than those al-
lowed by the existing portfolio solution methods. These techniques solve for the endogenous
portfolio shares evaluating the return di⁄erential, which is discounted at agents￿pricing ker-
nel. Hence, the complexity of (35)-(36) does not have to do with the return di⁄erentials
(RHt+1 ￿ rFt+1);(RFt+1 ￿ rFt+1) but with the second terms, the insurance component of the
EP. This is the way in which the private guarantee a⁄ects the choice between assets belonging
to di⁄erent classes.
In principle, this drawback of binding collateral constraints should also a⁄ect the comparison
between assets of the same class, the equities. However, in (37) there is no other term than the
excess return between home and foreign equities. According to DY, the explanation for this is
that each active investor internalizes the collateral constraint symmetrically across home and
foreign equities13. But in light of the analysis on counterparty risk carried out in the previous
section, the symmetric collateralization is itself an outcome, whose source is subtly hidden. The
following claim makes this point clear.
Claim. Assume that intra-agent loans are uniquely in￿uenced by leveraged investors￿credit-
worthiness (in its strict sense). It follows then that leveraged investors cannot bene￿t at all from
considering the shadow value of borrowing against di⁄erent collaterals as a part of the arbitrage
condition between home and foreign assets.
Reasoning by absurd, I make even a further step, in order to show what dynamics one would
obtain for the net foreign assets by applying the existing portfolio solution faithfully. To this end,
13See equations (20)-(21).
23I neglect the fact that (35)-(36) are di¢ cult to evaluate and aim at computing three portfolio
shares. Following Devereux and Sutherland (2011), this can be done de￿ning active investors￿








































Ht￿1 ￿ (RHt ￿ rFt)!b
Ht￿1
￿(RFt ￿ rFt)!b



























are the portfolio shares of home good bonds, foreign good bonds and home equities, respectively.
Postponing an interpretation of the transformed budget constraint and the related portfolio
shares, I now pass to show one possible approach to circumvent the problems posed by (35) and
(36), as a straightfoward application of the conventional approach is not strictly needed to obtain
the equilibrium portfolios. Due to the properties of secured bonds in the model, the system of
portfolio Eulers (35)-(37) contain one redundant equation and the dynamics of active investors￿
NFA can be adapted accordingly.
Remark 1. The collateral constraint is a strong tie not only for asset and liability sides
of balance sheets, but also for the liabilities among themselves: !b
Ht￿1 and !b
Ft￿1 in (38) are
interdependent.
In general, given (15), the overall per-capita value of local borrowing is at most equal to the
total size of the collateral. Portfolio choice solves then for the optimal level of cross-country
diversi￿cation. Concerning the zero-order component of portfolios, appendix (A) shows that this
procedure allows me to write (15) as
￿ q
b ￿ B
A = ￿ ￿￿ q
e￿ ￿
A
where the RHS is the market value of the pledge. Due to the symmetry between the two countries,
this constraint can be equivalently written as
￿ ￿￿ q
e￿ ￿







which implies that bond shares are closely linked in the long-run equilibrium:
￿ !
b
F = ￿￿ !
b




24Remark 2. The transmission of shocks is not entirely governed by the active agents￿NFA
because not all assets are collateralizable.
A major point made by DY is that the NFA dynamics create a transmission channel for
countrywide shocks because the balances of payments - which a⁄ect the tightness of collateral
constraints - are intertwined across countries. In fact, introducing trade in secured bonds this
remains true just for a part of international payment transactions, and the NFA can be technically




























which is formally correct but intrinsically ￿ awed because of double-counting. In the model, there
is no margin on short positions, but in (39) home secured bonds carry the same margin mt that
is required on active investors￿long positions. But this is just a ￿rst impression, as the e⁄ect
of the haircut on the LHS of (39) can be compensated with its e⁄ect on bonds on the RHS, for
bonds are by de￿nition included in active investors￿NFA. So netting out the two e⁄ects, the












































is the net foreign short (i.e., bond) position. NFEA
t and
NFBA




t . Of course, the global equilibrium in international
payments must be satis￿ed for both the newly de￿ned states: NFBA
t + NFB￿A




The implication of the previous two remarks is that one of the two portfolio shares is redun-
dant. Let ￿ !b









t￿1 is still de￿ned as in (38).
Using !b
































As in (14￿ ), !e
t￿1 depends on the excess returns between equities, rxt = rHt ￿ rFt, but !b
t￿1 is
now related only to a version of the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP), Rxt = RHt￿RFt.
As in Devereux and Yetman (2010), obtaining !
j
t￿1 < 0 means that home active investors hold
25less than 100 percent of the domestic per-capita stock of instrument j, with j = e;b. Clearly,
home investors holdings￿of foreign equities and bonds are, respectively, equal to NFEA ￿ !e
and NFBA ￿ !b.
A simple interpretation for (14￿ ) is as follows. The dynamics of NFA depend on capital and
non-capital income, net of consumption expenditures. Capital income has various components.
One is equal to the interest payments on the inherited stock of foreign equity, net of the interests
paid on foreign liabilities. Capital income is increasing in dividend payments, dHt￿A
Ht￿1, and in
the excess returns of home versus foreign equities, rxt!e
t￿1, while the same income decreases with
interest payments, BA
Ht￿1, and with the excess cost of home versus foreign funds, Rxt!b
t￿1. To
this net payo⁄ of foreign assets, active investors add the resources received selling new bonds,
qb
HtBA








The ultimate version of active investors￿budget constraint in (14￿ ) supports two arbitrage
conditions in two di⁄erent reference assets, the foreign bond and the foreign equity. So the three
portfolio Eulers in (35)-(37) can be simpli￿ed, combining the ￿rst two. In compact form, the














where ￿t = Pt=Pt￿1. The solution for the zero order component of international portfolios then






















The simpli￿cation of the portfolio problem achieved in this section supports the following
conclusion. When agents seek to diversify their international positions in assets that are subject
to some constraints (here, the size of the pledge), they act as if these constrained assets were
detached from the other instruments in the portfolio. Hence, the constrained assets are compared
only between themselves, and the NFA position can be distinguished in the component made
of constrained assets and the component containing all other ￿nancial instruments (here, only
equities). In this sense, the collateral constraint replaces the arbitrage condition between the
constrained and the unconstrained assets.
266 Calibration
I devote a distinct section to the calibration of the model because here I also describe my
structural approach to estimate the margin setting rules in (30) using aggregate data. I calibrate
all the model parameters with conventional methods, with the only exception of the haircut. In
this case, I combine standard strategies with a simulated method of moments (SMM) estimation
procedure.
6.1 Parameters excluding haircuts
As far as the parameters other than the haircut are concerned, I either draw from values used
in previous studies or perform computation on OECD data and ￿nancial time series. Table 1
reports all the parameters chosen in either one of these ways. In general, OECD data are used to
calibrate the forcing variables, and two ￿nancial time-series are useful to determine the steady
state values of the rate of interest and the risk premium (speci￿cally, the GP as de￿ned in (26)).
The OECD sample contains the G10 countries with the addition of Australia and Switzerland14,
the interest rate is from the UK and the US markets, and the overnight interest swap (OIS) rate
is from the US. Finally, one model period corresponds to one year.
Starting with the parameters that I borrow from previous studies, I follow DY for those
parameters that are present also in their model. This is the case of n, ￿, ￿, z and ￿. In
contrast, parameters such as ￿, ￿, ￿I, ￿I are specifc to the present model because DY do not
consider di⁄erentiated goods nor capital accumulation. As for ￿ and ￿, I follow the recent results
obtained by Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008). Using OECD data, they ￿nd that the elasticity
of substitution between traded goods is below 1 (i.e., 0.85), so I calibrate ￿ and ￿ accordingly. I
use similar values also for capital accumulation, under the assumption that the investment goods
bundles in (3) and the consumption goods bundles in (12) have similar properties. However, I
set ￿I, ￿I slightly above ￿, ￿, in order to allow for a steady state di⁄erence between CPI, Pt, and
the investment de￿ ator, P I
t .
The values attributed to all the remaining parameters are from real data. Coherently with the
model, I use ￿nancial time series that are relevant for interbank (i.e., intra-agents) transactions:
the interest rate is the 3-month LIBOR and, on the basis of the strong case made by Gorton
and Metrick (2009 b), the GP is proxied with the LIB-OIS spread. As far as the interest rate is
concerned, I consider the daily LIBOR prevailing in the U.K. and in the U.S. over December 31,
14The sample of countries is: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.
271998 to September 16, 2009. Converting these data on a yearly basis and computing averages
across both dates and markets, I obtain ￿ R = 1:0418. Turning to the GP, the 3-month LIB-OIS
spread is a good metric for the state of the U.S. interbank market. In an attempt to avoid the
e⁄ect of the recent ￿nancial crisis, I restrict my computation to the period between January 2004
and August 2007. The average spread over this period is equal to 11.34 basis points. Though
tiny15, this spread introduces an heterogeneity between discount factors which is su¢ cient to
generate a steady state di⁄erence between ￿ R and ￿ r (i.e., ￿ r > ￿ R).
The last set of parameters that I compute is the one specifying the exogenous states. There are
three exogenous variables, and one of them is the shock to the margin setting rule. Leaving this for
the next section, the other two exogenous shocks are the productivity shock and the investment
shock. Their dynamics is described by standard log-linear, autoregressive speci￿cations:












In general, I assume that shocks of di⁄erent types are independent yet shocks of the same
type can be correlated across countries. For instance, it can be that corr("At;"￿t) = 0 but
corr("At;"A￿t) 6= 0.
For productivity shocks, I take OECD data on GDP, employment and capital, in order to
construct Solow Residuals. For the investment shock, I follow Fisher (2006) and use OECD
statistics on CPI and investment de￿ ator to construct the ratios P=P I16. To have a balanced
panel and maximize data availability, I consider yearly observations between 1970 and 2010. For
the same reason, I also have to omit Germany because of the e⁄ect of reuni￿cation on its time
series, and, when computing Solow Residuals, Switzerland. I perform the same computation for
both Solow Residuals and price ratios: for each country, I take the log-transformation of the two
variables, I linearly detrend them and, ￿nally, I ￿t the resulting time series as AR(1) processes.
Averaging the persistence parameters and the second moments across countries, I obtain the
values in the last rows of Table 117.
15Consider that, during the crisis, the same spread reached levels even higher than 1 to 2 percentage points.
16The investment de￿ ator is the gross total ￿xed capital formation de￿ ator.
17The cross-country correlation between Solow residuals might seem very high, yet it is what I obtain when I
extend my sample. Early results based only on Canada, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. showed a much smaller
correlation. I can thus conclude that the high value obtained with the second sample is due to the inclusion of
the European countries.
286.2 Margin setting
Margins re￿ ecting borrowers￿creditworthiness are captured by the debt-to-value ratios in (30), so
the parameters that are still to be chosen are: ￿ ￿,  ,  
￿ and those describing the shock variables
￿￿t;￿￿￿t. While an assumption is needed for these innovations, the ￿rst three parameters are
obviously related with each other. Given (30), the long-run value of the debt-to-asset ratio
is ￿ ￿ =   +  
￿. Thus, I can combine straightforward calibration with structural estimation,
proceeding in three steps: computation of ￿ ￿ from observed statistics, speci￿cation of ￿￿t and,
￿nally, estimation of   (and  
￿).
To start with, I compute the steady state debt-to-asset ratio from real data on ￿nancial
institutions, the reason being that ￿ ￿ should be consistent with some time series which describe
the positions that ￿nancial intermediaries has taken in the recent past. In particular, ￿ ￿ should
be in line with the composition of their balance sheets, depending on what role they play in
interbank transactions. In this regard, an important information is available for the countries in
my sample: the OECD collects statistics on the institutional investors operating in each member
country. Since these statistics break the total assets of institutional investors in sub-categories,
in principle one can compute ratios that describe key features of investors￿balance sheets and try
to match them within the model. This is the route that I follow because the type of institutional
investors covered in the OECD database coincide with the notion of passive investor used here:
speci￿cally, I consider the categories "investment funds, consolidated" (i.e., mutual funds) and
"insurance corporations and pension funds, consolidated". For these two categories, I compute
the empirical shares-to-asset ratio prevailing over 1999-200618, and I match it with its theoretical
counterpart, ￿ qe￿ kP=
￿
￿ qe￿ kP ￿ ￿ qb ￿ BP￿
. The results are shown in Table 2. For that period, the cross-
country, cross-time average ratio is 0.49 for investment funds and 0.42 for insurance companies
and pension funds. So I choose to calibrate ￿ ￿ in such a way that ￿ qe￿ kP=
￿
￿ qe￿ kP ￿ ￿ qb ￿ BP￿
= 0:45.
As a result, I get ￿ ￿ = 0:31, which implies an haircut of 0.69 and a leverage of 1.45.
Although 0￿ ￿ = 0:31 might seem to imply a fairly high haircut - and the leverage might seem
correspondingly low, note that the frequency of my sample is quite high. When the time unit is
one year, the short-term debt is, by aggregation, a loan of duration no longer than 12 months.
Clearly, such a loan has a bigger haircut than a typical interbank transaction, which takes place
at much lower frequencies - the extreme example being the overnight deposit. Moreover, a caveat
of my computation is that I am implicitly assuming that whatever non-leveraged institutional
18Including the observations for 2007 might a⁄ect the computation of a steady state parameter through the
e⁄ects of the crisis (i.e., ￿nanciers hoarding behaviour), so I remove that observation. However, the averages over
the period 1999-2007 are almost identical to those reported in Table 2.
29investors hold in other forms than shares is lent to active investors. However, this assumption
is not a bad approximation. At an early stage, I used to calibrate ￿ ￿ as the debt-to-assets ratio
of the U.S. shadow banking sector, which is the real-world representative of the sector of active
investors. I consider as shadow banks classi￿ed in this way by Adrian and Shin19 (2009), and I
take data from the Federal Flow of Funds. To remove the e⁄ect of the crisis-driven deleveraging,
I restrict my attention to the years between 1997 and 2006 and ￿nd the results in Table 2, which
refer to the average shadow bank type. As shown, the computation retrieves values close to 0.31,
with some variation around this value depending on whether I keep or remove assets vis-￿-vis
household and public sectors (i.e., types of bank credit which are not considered in the model).
Therefore, my preference for OECD data can be justi￿ed on two grounds. One is the consistency
with the overall calibration; the other is the aim to avoid the steady state of a two-country model
to be that of a single country such as the U.S.
Next, I estimate  ; 
￿, conditionally on the calibrated value for ￿ ￿. More precisely, what I
do is to estimate  , given all the calibrated parameters, and then compute  
￿ as a residual.
My empirical strategy is based on the following consideration: data on haircuts are not at all
overwhelming, but a structural framework may help pin down their determinants as haircuts
must be consistent with the structure of the model itself. Again, this is an indirect - or implicit
- computation as the one for the steady state value ￿ ￿. The literature contains some direct
attempts. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) plot the margins on S&P 500 futures for members
of the CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange) and ￿nd that margins are not constant over time.
Gorton and Metrick (2009 a,b) construct an index for repo haircuts from the period preceding
the recent ￿nancial meltdown onwards. Their index goes from zero before the crisis to about 0.5
during it. However, CME data on S&P 500 futures are just a proxy for the haircuts on interbank
loans, and the message they deliver is in contrast with the ￿ndings on repo transactions. At odds
with Gorton and Metrick￿ s results, CME haircuts were never zero from 1982 to 2008.
My point is just that, in spite of some preceding empirical attempts, the estimation or sta-
tistical measurement of haircuts is still a largely unexplored domain. So praising the previous
approaches for their pioneering e⁄ort and getting inspiration from them, I try to follow an alter-
native route. Let the debt-to-asset ratios, the LHS variables of equations (30), be unobservable
variables, a case which can be handled with a matching-moment procedure, the SMM. This SMM
estimator is used with the objective of identifying, at least, one of   and  
￿. Speci￿cally, since
￿ ￿ =   +  
￿, the natural expectation is that one can only indentify one parameter and compute
the other as a residual; however, I do not impose it a priori. If the identi￿cation is possible, then
19See at the bottom of Table 2 for a de￿nition.
30I can conclude that the data validate the margin setting behaviour derived above as a possible
interpretation of time-varying haircuts. As there is still no consensus on their determinants, hair-
cuts are assimilated to the taste shocks in Du¢ e and Singleton (1993), with a slightly di⁄erent
estimation approach than the one used today to parametrize DSGE models20.
According to (30), ￿t;￿￿
t could be simply regressed on the log-return generated by home and
foreign equities. The OECD database contains the time series of the stock market indexes of
the countries in my sample. To estimate   and  
￿, I thus combine these time series with those
of purely macroeconomic variables such as output, consumption, investment, etc. The goal is
to ￿nd out whether there is a set of empirical moments that provides empirical support to the
adjustment in haircuts as in (30).
The way I estimate ￿t;￿￿
t has some similarities with the (G)ARCH approach to VaR limits,
because of the set of moments that I choose and of the way I specify the shocks ￿￿t;￿￿￿t.
Remanding to appendix 9.2 for more details on the intuition, the data used and computational
algorithm, consider ￿rst the problem of estimating or proxying the shock to debt-to-asset ratios.
I use OECD data on private consumption, output, stock market indices, ￿xed capital formation
(i.e., investment), ￿xed capital stock, and so on. In general, I have data from 1975 to 2010,
which amounts to T = 3521. In theory, one wants to study the behaviour of variables that,
given the model equations, are expected to be strongly a⁄ected by ￿t;￿￿
t. On empirical grounds,
the model does a better job in reproducing the behaviour of consumption and output than, for
instance, ￿xed capital formation (i.e., investment) and ￿xed capital stock; also, the correlations
of the ￿rst two variables with stock market indices are better evaluated than those of the latter
two variables with the same indices. Nevertheless, the model tends to overestimate the (average)
volatility of equity prices, which is most probably due to the strength of binding collateral
constraints. Therefore, being more interested in the explanatory part of equations in (30) than
to its shock component, I simplify the problem and proxy ￿￿t with (the mean equation for) lnrt,
where rt represents the return on the local stock market index. Though very approximative,
this assumption allows me to control for all of the features of log equity returns which are not
captured by the explanatory part of (30): namely persistence, volatility and cross-correlation.
Coherently, I specify ￿￿t as an autoregressive process, whose form is akin to that of productivity
20SMM estimators are increasingly used for attributing a value to the of DSGE models, leaving to pure cal-
ibration only those that are impossible to identify or standard to use. In this way, are implicitly treated as
unobservable even variables for which the dataset contains an implicit or explicit proxy based on some theory
(e.g., productivity shocks can be proxied with the Solow Residual). However, this does not create any problem
because the ￿nal objective is to validate the models using an easier alternative to, say, the GMM estimator.
21One lag is needed to compute the log returns on stock indices as di⁄erences in log price data.
31and investment shocks:






The cross-country average of the empirical log returns on OECD ￿ts an AR(1) process reasonably
well. That is, although I neglect possible (G)ARCH e⁄ects, the autocorrelation and partial-
correlation functions of the average time series show that residuals are well behaved (i.e. not
serially correlated). Hence, I compute ￿r;￿2
r using the residuals on the average time series, and
I obtain corr(rt;r￿
t) averaging across pairwise correlations between country-speci￿c time series,
whose behaviour is largely AR(1) as well. Recall that I impose shocks of di⁄erent types not to
be cross-correlated, but I allow each shock to be correlated across countries.
Adding ￿{;￿2
￿ and corr("￿t;"￿￿t) to the above parametrization, I estimate   by SMM and
compute  
￿ residually (i.e.,  
￿ = ￿ ￿  ). In the ultimate re￿nements, I attempt to match the
following set of moments: 1) the home consumption-output correlation; 2) the home stock price-
output correlation; 3) the skewness of equity returns; 4) the kurtosis of equity returns. The last
two moments allow me control for the (G)ARCH-like e⁄ects neglected so far; more speci￿cally, I
can check how far the model goes from observed data when (G)ARCH-like e⁄ects are not directly
imposed - as it is instead usually done in empirical ￿nance. As reported in the appendix, I use
usual estimating formulas and test statistics in a speci￿c minimization and simulation algorithm,
which adapts the SMM to the speci￿c features of this paper. Since I match three moments for
estimating just one parameter, there are three possible degrees of overidenti￿cation; consequently,
I test for overidenti￿cation restrictions (OIR test).
The results are in Table 3, where I report not only the estimation of (30), but also that of
the AR(1) for the forcing process. As far as this shock is concerned, its persistence is much
lower than in the case of pruductivity shocks. Nevertheless, its variance is almost always twice
as big as that of productivity and investment shocks, and it tends to be more correlated across
countries. Turning the attention to the SMM estimate, I present results for di⁄erent Ts, which
is the length of a time-series of simulated data. As usual Ts = ￿T, where ￿ is equal to 10, 20
and 30, meaning that simulated data are as long as 350, 700 and 1050 points. In order to control
for small sample bias, I consider ￿ as the number of repetitions needed to construct a sample of
simulated data rather than the length a simulated sample obtained in one shot. For every ￿, I
￿nd that the the minimum distance between empirical and simulated moments is achieved when
  is between 0.12 and 0.13. Since the asymptotic properties of the estimator improve as ￿ ! 1,
I choose the case of ￿ = 30 as my benchmark estimation.
For this case, the shape of the criterion function (i.e., the squared distance between empirical
and theoretical data) is as shown in Figure 4, which con￿rms that only one parameter can be
32identi￿ed. The criterion function is well-behaved along one dimension and basically ￿ at on the
other, which is partly due to the fact that, as shall be clear below, equity prices are strongly
correlated across countries in presence of binding collateral constraints. The identi￿ed parameter
is  , which I eventually choose to be 0.126, implying  
￿ = 0:185. The last four columns of Table 3
show how the model performs at the optimum in terms of matching the empirical moments. Given
the fact that the model does not contain many of the features of RBC models, some predictive
weakness of the model has to be expected. For instance, ￿(ctYHt) is roughtly 0.2 higher in the
data than in the model, but the model does not allow for habits in consumption, labor in output
and utility, and so on. Not surprisingly, the model does a bit better in reproducing the moments
of ￿nancial variables. The match of ￿(qe
Ht;Yt) is almost perfect, and so is remarkably that of the
empirical kurtosis. Here, data turn out to be slightly - and probably insigni￿cantly - platykurtic,
which I deem to be a feature of their low frequency; fatter tails show up at higher frequencies.
Where the model fails the most is in reproducing real-world skewness. In aggregate data, stock
returns are negatively skewed, meaning that the bulk of the concentration of return data is on
the right of the mean. With ￿ = 30, the model is capable to predict the negative sign, but in
absolute terms, it fails to reproduce a skewness of about j0:7j. One explanation for this weakness
of the model might be related to the solution method for dynamic macro-models. If the mean
corresponds to stock returns in the steady state, then simulating the model through a series
of shocks can skew the distribution around the mean, but the allowed distance from the mean
should be small. If it was not so, the linearization around the steady state would break down.
In any case, the weaknesses of the theoretical model are not so large that the four moments used
represent a bad choice. At 5 percent signi￿cance, the test for OIR cannot reject the hypothesis
that the three extra-moments are valid to identify  .
7 Numerical solution
7.1 Portfolios
I solve the model numerically, writing it as in Devereux and Sutherland (2011)22. Through their
formula, the second order approximation of (41) yields the zero-order portfolio holdings displayed
in Table 4. In this table, positions are reported for two levels of aggregation. The ￿rst level is
22I use standard Matlab functions for the analysis of linear systems. However, the implementation of the
Devereux-Sutherland method requires caution with some control and state variables (their 2007 working paper is
more speci￿c on this aspect). I gratefully acknowledge the help received by Alan Sutherland, whose reply allowed
me to double-check my ￿les.
33the most disaggregated one, being targeted at the two groups of households in each country. The
corresponding portfolio holdings are a measure of international diversi￿cation. The second level
of aggregation refers to the two groups of households across countries. This amounts to determine
the overall availability of a certain asset for a given sector in each country. Finally, to clarify
what portion of each asset is internationally traded, the bottom two lines distinguish international
￿nancial transactions according to the country where assets originate. Each quantity is valued
at market prices and scaled by total ouput23.
Passive investors invest in home capital and buy domestic good bonds issued by cross-border
investors but do not hold foreign capital. Indeed, they ￿nance ￿nal goods production only
indirectly, in their role of bond investors. It follows that even their holdings of home capital
are not employed by local ￿rms. Thus, this is capital that passive investors subtract from that
backed by internationally traded claims. It can be termed as non-tradable capital, given by the
variables kP
H;k￿P
F in (22)-(25) and (34). The table shows that, in the symmetric equilibrium, the
value of both of these stocks is 0.8. Passive investors put their remaining wealth in local good
bonds. Both home and foreign ￿nanciers show a tendency to purchase more bonds from domestic
issuers (0.78) than from foreign issuers (0.21).
Active investors take positions in all the segments of ￿nancial markets, diversifying their
assets and liabilities across countries. On the liability side, they start with a debtor position
of 0.99 vis-￿-vis local passive investors, but as soon as international ￿nancial transactions are
concluded some of this debt is exchanged for foreign debt. The pattern of diversi￿cation shapes
the above passive investors￿bond portfolios and, thus, shows a greater exposure to local ￿nanciers
than to foreign ones. On the asset side, since ￿ ￿ = 0:31 and active investors￿total debt sums to
0.99, their overal capital ownership turns out to be 3.18. Out of this total amount, local ￿rms
receive 1.88, and foreign ￿rms 1.3. Once again, this means that active agents prefer to take
positions within the national borders.
The same situation can be read under another perspective, that is, at the level of productive
sectors. The backyard sector is owned (and run) by passive investors, and has a creditor position
with respect to the ￿nal goods sector. Since both its factor and its product remain within the
sector, it is termed NT (non-tradable) sector just for clarity (not accuracy). On the other hand,
the ￿nal goods sector uses T (tradable) goods when investing in capital and selling its output.
Owners of this sector are the active investors, who have a debtor position vis-￿-vis the saving
23"Total output" in the steady state is the sum of ￿nal goods production and economy-wide backyard produc-




. I consider total ouput because I show results for both agents￿portfolios. Otherwise, I
generally refer to GPD as the lone production of ￿nal goods.
34sector. The interesting thing here is that we can easily capture the power of leverage: this is
the extent to which leveraged owners (who proxy for leveraged intermediaries) lead ￿rms to
boost their investment beyond what the internal resources would allow. Table 4 shows that the
availability of external funds (0.99) allow ￿rms to use as much capital as 3.18, although their net
worth is just 2.19.
The above tendency of active investors to attract a large share of 0.99 from local ￿nanciers
and to invest more in local than foreign capital can be assessed more precisely as the ratio of
local holdings (or positions) to the total position in each asset class. As for equities, this is a
proxy of the so-called home equity bias; concerning secured bond, the ratio can be termed as
local funding bias whenever it exceeds 0.5. Table 5 reports the results I obtain for both the
case analyzed so far (baseline calibration) and a series of sensitivity excercises aimed at a deeper
analysis. The precise formulas that I use are at the bottom of the table.
The above ￿gures for international diversi￿cation and sectoral allocation give rise to both
home equity bias and home funding bias: the ￿rst equals 60 percent of the local stock, and the
second 78.8 percent of total debt. In other words, there is always local bias, and the largest
one is that restraining the diversi￿cation of the (secured) liability portfolio. The presence of
local equity bias is not entirely surprising as the model embeds investment expenditures as in
Coeudarcier et al. (2010). So, in spite of the fact that here international investors are subject
to collateral constraints, capital accumulation is strong enough to break the perfect correlation
between capital income and non-capital income, as it was in their model24. Indeed, the analytical
￿ndings of section 5 suggest that binding collateral constraints should not be expected to a⁄ect
the equity portfolio so much. Formally, the e⁄ect of the pledge is that of replacing the arbitrage
conditions between secured ￿nancial instruments (bonds) and non-secured instruments (equities).
It follows that arbitrage cannot bridge changes in collateral to changes in equity portfolio shares.
These shares matter instead from another viewpoint. Binding constraints imply that the
debt-to-asset ratios behave as in (30), and an estimate for   is available through the empirical
strategy discussed in the previous section. Given these results and the link between (13) and
(30), I can purge  ; 
￿ from the e⁄ect of equity portfolio shares. The computation is of interest
as it measures the pure sensitivity of ￿t;￿￿
t (measures of borrowers￿creditworthiness) to local
and foreign collateral:
 
local equity bias = 0:213 ;
 ￿
1 - local equity bias = 0:450
24When capital income is perfectly correlated with non-capital income, the prediction of international portfolio
models goes back to Baxter and Jermann (1997): investors tend to use foreign equities as a protection against
their labour income risk.
35Focusing more on the qualitative implications than on the quantitative accuracy, the above result
means that borrowers￿creditworthiness is more "threatened"25 by changes in the value of foreign
collateral than by changes in the value of local assets. An explanation for this is that diversifying
short (guaranteed) positions across countries is always subject to a mismatch. Home ￿nanciers
can receive foreign collateral, but the promise made by borrowers is to repay at the rate of interest
prevailing in the local economy. Seemingly, foreign ￿nanciers accept home equity as collateral,
but they expect to be eventually repaid at the rate of interest prevailing in the foreign economy.
More insights on the link between equilibrium portfolios and collateral are o⁄ered by the
sensitivity of endogenous equity and bond shares to model parameters. I focus on the following
parameters: ￿, ￿, ￿I, ￿I, ￿ ￿ and its split between   and  
￿. The ￿rst four parameters, ￿, ￿, ￿I, ￿I,
have to do with the revealed preferences for consumption and investment goods across countries.
Interested mainly in the sign of the change than its absolute value, I study what happens when
￿;￿I increase by 0.10 and ￿;￿I increase by 0.20. This last test is especially important as it allows
me to determine what happens when the elasticity of substitution between goods raises above 1:
apart from Corsetti et al. (2008), many studies assume that ￿;￿I take on values larger than 1.
My ￿ndings are in line with the previous literature. The most sensitive portfolio share is the bond
portfolio, which renders the equity share as stable as empirical observations suggest (Coeudarcier
and Gourinchas, 2009). Bond shares increase univocally in all four cases, and especially so for
higher values of ￿;￿I: this provides evidence on the hedging properties of bonds. Bonds are used
as a protection against shocks to the terms of trade (Coeudarcier et al., 2007).
While the sensitivity tests discussed so far do not add any new ￿ndings to previous knowledge,
some new inference can be drawn from the sensitivity to changes in ￿ ￿; ; 
￿. Speci￿cally, I
consider two alternative scenarios: 1) a steady state where ￿ ￿ is greater than in the baseline case
by 0.1, while keeping  =￿ ￿ constant; 2) a steady state where the role of   and  
￿ on ￿ ￿ is inverted
(  = 0:185,  
￿ = 0:126), for the same ￿ ￿ as in the baseline scenario. The latter exercise is actually
a simple double-check for the consistency between analytical and numerical results. In principle,
the relation between   and  
￿ should not a⁄ect the steady state, which only depend on their
sum. Indeed, the last row in Table 5 shows that portfolio shares are completely invariant with
respect to a switch between   and  
￿. What changes is only the e⁄ect of home and foreign
collateral on credit risk (in the last two columns of the table). More intersting is instead the ￿rst
exercise, which amounts to questioning what is the e⁄ect of higher leverage on diversi￿cation.
Note that an increase of 0.1 in the debt-to-asset ratio increases leverage from 1.45 to 1.69; this
25Recall that, though not microfounded, the behaviour of ￿t;￿￿
t depend on ￿nanciers￿reaction to (perceived)
borrowers￿creditworthiness.
36means that the relative increase in leverage is almost twice as large as the initial increase in ￿ ￿.
In response to such a change, active investors would increasingly tilt their bond portfolio to the
home market, while equity home bias would stay the same.
In combination with the analytics of the model, I interpret the results of this sensitivity
analysis as follows. Secured bonds combine the features of unsecured portfolios with the speci￿city
of the pledge. As any other bond for which the model does not involve constraints, a secured bond
insure against the risk in the terms of trade. However, its reactiveness to this risk is hightened in
comparison with that of an unsecured bond: now ￿ uctuations in the terms of trade do not only
depend on preference parameters, but also on ￿ ￿. Strikingly, the e⁄ect of leverage is completely
absorbed by bonds, supporting the theoretical observation that the collateral constraint replaces
arbitrage conditions. In turn, this result supports the derivation of equations (14￿ ) and (40),
that show indeed that leveraged investors￿unique benchmark is the UIP condition when choosing
between home and foreign ￿nanciers.
Clearly, the model overestimate the sensitivity of secured bonds to model parameters due
to the absence of unsecured bonds. Introducing such ￿nancial instruments would improve the
quantitative predictions of the model, but the qualitative gain would almost surely be outpaced
by the increase in the required technical analysis.
7.2 Business-cycle shocks: loss spirals and adjusting haircuts
Although the dynamics of the two-country framework depend on the state of six exogenous vari-
ables, economic ￿ uctuations are mainly caused by country-speci￿c productivity shocks. Contrary
to what some closed economy studies suggest, here investment shocks do not cause large business
cycles. One reason for this may be seen in the home equity bias reproduced by the model: leading
to local bias, the e⁄ects of investment shocks are (partly) neutralized by optimally diversi￿ed
equity portfolios. Shocks to haircuts are instead more meaningful, but the mechanism that they
put into motion is the same as the one activated by productivity shocks - together with the
analysis that shall be conducted in the next section. Thus, I limit the analysis contained in this
section to the e⁄ects of an unexpected fall of 1 percent in home country productivity.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of key variables: prices of assets, terms of trade, out-
standing debt expressed in a given country good, investors￿capital holdings, and so on. Under
binding collateral constraints and ￿nancial integration, these variables show a strong tendency
to comove, evidence that the international transmission mechanism formalized by DY is at work.
In terms of (15￿ ), current account balances link collateral values across countries by determining
traders￿NFE positions.
37Accounting for this angle of collateral constraints, Figure 5 shows a case of the well-known
contraction set o⁄by margin requirements. A perverse cycle involving real and ￿nancial variables
follows, the origin of it being the immediate reaction of prices. At home, the shock to productivity
traduces directly in a reduction in the market value of shares. In the foreign economy, the
adjustment is a bit more complex. For one thing, trade in goods implies that pFt must follow
the dynamics of home country productivity. For another, the initial portfolio diversi￿cation
guarantees that not only home active investors but also foreign traders (who hold ex ante 40
percent of the total capital stock) would be negatively hit by the negative valuation e⁄ect on
home equity holdings. Hence, foreign equity prices drop as well.
Thus, the initial fall in home equity prices leads to a ￿rst decrease in the worth of international
investors worlwide. A margin call follows for all of them, reducing their capability to borrow,
so that also their ￿nancial support to ￿nal goods ￿rms must correspondingly decrease. Finally,
these ￿rms are forced to use less capital, so that both output and investment plunge, in line
with decreased consumption expenditures. As one would expect in a contraction, the fall in
investment spending is more severe than that in consumption.
The problem posed by binding collateral constraints is that a macroeconomic adjustment
to equilibrium is not readily possible. The drop in output and investment can be seen as the
last stage of the ￿rst round. Coupled with the consequences it leads to, the ￿rst margin call
is enhanced by the fall in the value of foreign equities and eventually translates into another
fall in prices, a new margin call and further rounds. However, this perverse cycle displays an
interesting pattern here. Between the third and fourth steps ahead, the system starts to bene￿t
from a correcting mechanism that accelerates the convergence of variables from date 5 onwards.
This correction matches the behaviour of haircuts and of guarantee premia at the bottom of the
￿gure, but in fact the process begins with the adjustment in haircuts. This conclusion is drawn
from an analogous exercise, which I conduct shutting down the rules in (30). The results for this
alternative case are in Figure 6, whose ￿rst message is that, absent any adjustment in margins,
the home country productivity shock has very persistent e⁄ects. The slowdown in the capability
to borrow, equity ownership and consumption of ￿nal goods at step 5 is (in absolute terms)
almost as large as the impact multiplier. Not surpraisingly, in this case the GPs goes back slowly
after an initial jump.
Before pursuing a deeper analysis of the di⁄erences between the two cases, I brie￿ y attempt
a ￿rst interpretation of the results so far, getting inspiration from Brunnermeier (2009). The last
exercise corresponds to a margin call where, for given leverage, the market value of collateral
plunges by a given amount (about j1:6j at home and j1:2j in the foreign economy; Figure 6) leading
38to a quantitatively equivalent decrase in short positions (at market prices). Using Brunnermeier￿ s
terminology, this perverse cycle is a cycle where only "loss-spirals" take place. The ￿rst exercise
shows, however, that this is not necessarily the complete picture of the overall e⁄ects of binding
collateral constraints; a loss-spiral does not capture the reaction of players in the market for
funds. Starting from an already binding state, these constraints must adjust to the post-shock
scenario, the di⁄erence being that it is now more likely that borrowers (leveraged investors) will
face further losses in the future. In few words, borrowers￿creditworthiness falls everywhere, and
so does their ability to leverage, which is the ￿ ipping side of tightening haircuts on intra-agents
loans. This is a cycle that combines loss-spirals with what I termed above as adjustment in
margins. In quantitative terms, the credit crunch is larger in size than the initial fall in agents￿
shareholdings, both on impact and at the nadir of the slowdown (Figure 5).
Clearly, the question is now to understand how the adjustment in margins interact with the
loss-spirals, extracting information from the observed response functions. To this end, I perform
three experiments, reporting the results in Figures 7, 8-9 and 10, respectively.
First, I take the di⁄erence betwen the dynamics caused by loss-spirals with adjusting margins
and those caused by loss-spirals-only contractions; see Figure 7. Reading it intuitively, the graph
shows that the ￿rst e⁄ect of the adjustment is to highten the contraction, suggesting that lenders
get more concerned about counterparty risk, in the restrictive sense considered here. This can
occur on impact and/or up to the third period after the initial productivity shock. At this point,
the situation reverts and a correction can start. This is guaranteed by the fact that haircuts go
back to normal because active investors have had time to start repaying their debts in a credible
way. Indeed, just after the shock, the relative change in haircuts is almost 0.3. And it stays
there also for the next period, a sign that passive investors are very unwilling to lend further
resources. A remarkable evidence of this unwillingness is given by the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the
shock on the volume of bonds issued in either goods on dates 2 to 3 ahead: basically, -1. Yet,
this severe reaction gives active investors the opportunity to deleverage, repay some debt and,
consequently, regain credibility. All in all, adjustment in margins have both an impact e⁄ect and
a subsequent e⁄ect, with contrasting signs.
Second, I study how these two e⁄ects originate and which of them tend to prevail over a longer
horizon. I focus on impact multipliers (Figure 8) as well as cumulative multipliers (Figure 9),
computing the latter over the ￿rst 5 steps after the shock, deemed to be the bulk of the dynamic
reaction. Let then introduce the possibility of an adjustment in margins in a progressive way,
for  ; 
￿ that are raised from zero to their estimated or implied value. To start with, it is easy
to see that there is a univocal pattern for each of the two types of multipliers on a set of key
39macroeconomic variables: the stocks of debt and capital, bond prices and the ￿ ow of investment
(i.e., the top four diagrams). As haircuts increase, the impact e⁄ects of the shock on the stock
of debt, that of capital and investment is negative and gets larger in absolute value. On a
cumulative basis instead, debt (with its own price) proves almost insensitive, while capital and
investment show even a progressive improvement. The gain is the market discipline provided
by the guarantee when margins can adjust to changes in counterparty risk, as re￿ ected in the
dynamics of the risk premium paid by borrowers.
The same experiment is informative about what happens to agents￿speci￿c positions (not ag-
gregate variables) as margins are allowed to react. Quite evident is the fact that active investors￿
e⁄ective borrowing (outstanding debt in value terms) worsens both on impact and cumulatively.
This is not surprising: if there is one variable that should pay for the cumulative improvement in
debt, capital and investment, this is borrowing. It matters that the reaction of passive investors
is to stop completely trusting in borrowers. But perhaps more important is the cross-country
e⁄ect of the adjustment. International investors￿￿nancial assets and liabilities tend to converge
under the e⁄ect exerted by time-varying haircuts. Insofar as ￿nancial instruments are used by
the two economies to insure against each other. This result can be read as an improvement in
risk sharing.
Finally and consequentially, I use a simple counterfactual simulation to check this ￿rst im-
pression of a link between the movement in margins and ￿nancial integration. The logic is simple:
consider two extreme cases, ￿nancial integration as implied in the model and autarky, and won-
der what would happen to active investors￿balance sheets were diversi￿cation less important
for the assessment of counterparty risk. Let thus the case in which   =  
￿ = ￿ ￿=2 be de￿ned
as "complete integration in setting haircuts" and the case   = ￿ ￿; 
￿ = 0 denote full autarky.
As Figure 10 shows, if haircuts were imposed neglecting ￿nancial integration, impact multipliers
would once again remain una⁄ected but cumulative multipliers would lead to a divergence be-
tween agents￿asset holding. Due to the adjustment in haircuts, this divergence is more evident
for active investors￿ability to borrow than for their long positions. Together with the previous
experiments, I interpret this result simply as follow. Leading all the other factors aside, interna-
tional traders￿with diversi￿ed portfolios are more likely to have an equivalent credit risk across
(symmetric) countries. Note that this is not driven by changes in optimal portfolio shares: as
the previous section shows, portfolio shares are insensitive to the  -to- 
￿ ratio (Table 5, last
row). So, even if there was full local bias in the demand for intra-agents funds, passive investors
would still be concerned about the world economy as long as their borrowers continue to pledge
a diversi￿ed collateral portfolio of assets.
407.3 Ampli￿cation and margin spirals?
Given the previous results, the model with loss spirals and time-varying margins suggest that,
after an initial worsening of the contraction, the adjustment in the haircuts has stabilizing prop-
erties. Interestingly, Genakoplos (2009) concludes that endogenous changes in leverage have
these types of properties for the most of the possible economic shocks. From another viewpoint,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) ￿nd that stabilizing margins are prevailing when ￿nanciers
have enough information about the fundamentals of the economy. However, both studies point
out that alternative conditions bring to even more cyclical, if not diverging, dynamics: in the
￿rst case, these dynamics are caused by shocks to the tail distribution of asset returns; in the
second, they are due to lack of information.
Various questions can then arise. One may wonder whether the adjustment in margins add
anything to the traditional properties of credit constraints, which are asymmetry and ampli￿-
cation of business cycles (Kocherlakota, 2000). Pushing the analysis a bit further, one can thus
search for cases in which the stabilizing property of haircuts shows a tendency to break down
even in the model at hand. These are the two questions that I address in this last section, focus-
ing only on ampli￿cation and risk. I disregard any consideration on the possibility that binding
collateral constraints cause asymmetries between negative and positive phases of the business
cycle.
To start with, I examine the ampli￿cation e⁄ects of binding collateral constraints. Given
the international transmission, evidence of ampli￿cation does not only show how quantitatively
important are the collateral constraints for the size of the business cycles of each single economy,
but also how they lead to hightened comovement between two given countries. Again, I con-
sider a subset of key macroeconomic variables. As in the literature on Sudden Stops (Mendoza
and Smith, 2006; Mendoza, 2010), the term ampli￿cation refers to the di⁄erential behaviour
of macroeconomic variables when collateral constraints are binding as compared to the uncon-
strained scenario. The information is extracted from the responses to shocks over a given time
horizon and not from the impact multipliers, the latter being the approach originally suggested
by Kocherlakota (2000). I then construct a Monte-Carlo experiment26, where the unconstrained
model (i.e., the model where collateral constraints do not bind) is built as in DY: by construction,
the fact that constraints are non-binding means that agents have homogeneous time preferences,
26The Monte Carlo experiment is setup as follows. I simulate time-series of 70 datapoints (as the model is
calibrated in years), which are then ￿ltered and subject to a burn-in of the ￿rst 50 observations. I repeat this
simulation for N = 600 times.
41yet passive investors lend in the steady state in the same way as they do when collateral is
binding. Note that, in the non-binding case, the analytical results on portfolio choice described
in section 5 do not apply: to solve for portfolios I have to use the three standard arbitrage
conditions, together with the NFA dynamics in (14￿ ). I compute the ampli￿cation coe¢ cients
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where ^ xi denotes a variable in deviation from its steady state at repetition r and the superscripts
"c" and "u" denote the constrained or unconstrained by collateral, respectively. Under this
de￿nition, there is evidence of ampli￿cation only if ac(x) > 0.
One caveat of my analysis is that these ampli￿cation coe¢ cients have been developed with
models of occasionally binding credit constraints (global optimum). The drawback is that, since
the collateral constraints are always binding or non-binding, it is impossible for me to capture any
endogenous non-linear e⁄ects given by the structural break between one state and the next one.
However, the analysis can be justi￿ed on two grounds. First, this is an international portfolio
model, which follows the recent advancements on the subject; all of these are based on local
solutions28. Second, even in the occasionally binding tradition, the debt-to-asset ratios would be
zero in the unconstrained states and equal to some calibrated positive value in the constrained
states.
That said, results are reported in Table 6 for di⁄erent speci￿cations and various combinations
of states. The ￿rst column reports the results for the model suggested by DY, the others refer to
the model developed here. Being a building structure for my framework, I solve and simulate the
model of DY under my calibration, with the aim of ￿nding out whether the collateral limits are










xc (s1;s2;:::;sn) ￿ xu (s1;s2;:::;sn)
xu (s1;s2;:::;sn)
where s1;s2;:::;sn are state variables and Pr(constraintjs1;s2;:::;sn) is the conditional probability of the
constraint being binnding/non-binding. In my setup, I cannot account for this probability, but I look at volatility.
In addition, the approximation method allows me to simplify the computation of relative changes.
I bene￿ted from a message by Enrique Mendoza on the properties of this coe¢ cient and its superiority to
previous attempts (Smith and Mendoza, 2006); I am very graful to him for these advices.
28For a general study on portfolios in presence of heterogeneous agents which uses a global solution, see Judd,
Kubler and Schmedders (2002). Their method is based on approximating the equilibrium equations using collo-
cation splines.
42not only able to generate international transmission, but also the ampli￿cation often attributed
to them by another strand of the literature. Consequently, the systems faces shocks to home
and foreign productivity only. As shown in the table, I obtain a couple of interesting ￿ndings.
One is that their model reproduces a great deal of symmetry across countries, which is probably
justi￿ed by the fact that it is a one good model without capital accumulation. The other ￿nding
is that their model shows very little ampli￿cation, with the exception of two variables: home and
foreign borrowing. These two exceptions show heterogenous ampli￿cation coe¢ cients, but this
di⁄erence might be explained by some of the results obtained by the authors themselves29.
The model developed in this paper yields di⁄erent results. Some variables behave basically
in the same way, no matter whether collateral limits bind or not. These are variables such as
home equity price, home (per capita) capital, etc. for which ac(x) is even slightly negative.
These variables produce little ampli￿cation also in DY. In all the other cases ampli￿cation is
quantitatively relevant, emphasizing the asymmetry between home and foreign variables. Only
the reaction of home and foreign investment is ampli￿ed equally by the collateral constraints,
probably due to the fact that these variables are modelled as symmetric CES bundles of goods
di⁄erentiated across countries. As for the asymmetry between the ampli￿cation of home and
foreign comparable variables, the natural candidates to which this asymmetry can be imputed
are the terms of trade (as captured by pFt, in the last row of the table). The reaction of the
relative price of foreign goods to the introduction of collateral limits is to have more ampli￿ed
swings around the steady state: these are increased by more than 7 percent in comparison to the
unconstrained model. The sensitivity analysis on computed portfolios performed above shows in
fact that the collateral constraint interacts with the ￿ uctuations in the terms of trade, so that
secured bonds can be used as a protection against these ￿ uctuations.
Remarkably, the model produces basically the same results, no matter what types of speci￿-
cations and shocks one takes into account. In other words, what I have just obtained is valid for
the model with only loss spirals (column 2) as well as for the model with adjustment in margins
(subsequent columns). The most striking result is that even the shock to the debt-to-asset ratios,
"￿t;"￿￿t, does not lead to (economically and quantitatively) di⁄erent ampli￿cation coe¢ cients.
The same is true for a double-check that I do replacing the shocks to debt-to-assets ratios with
the investment shocks, "￿t;"￿￿t. The message coming from this puzzling results is twofold. First,
the result con￿rms that in a two-country portfolio model the main drivers of business cycles are
29DY found that, when no further restrictions are imposed on the endogenous determination of portfolios,
the impulse response functions of foreign borrowing is wider in absolute value than that of domestic borrowing.
Indeed, in their case home equity bias is generated by an "iceberg cost" (Tille and Van Wincoop, 2010). In
absence of such a cost - the case here - agents tend to show foreign bias.
43the productivity shocks, while the investment shocks are neutralized through diversi￿cation in
equity holdings. Second, abstracting from its e⁄ects on the dynamics of the system, the fact that
collateral constraints tighten do not create any additional ampli￿cation with respect to the one
already generated by their bindness.
I now pass to the second question: are there cases in which the correcting properties of the
adjustment in haircuts break down? Ampli￿cation coe¢ cients are not so informative for this
question because, in the model, haircuts mt;m￿
t change with ￿t;￿￿
t, which are the ￿rst variables
to capture changes in borrowers￿creditworthiness. In this sense, depending on their properties,
time-varying haircuts may leave ampli￿cation on average una⁄ected (ac(x) does not change for
any x), but they may still increment the swings around this average (creating additional risk).
My approach to disentangle these e⁄ects is the following: I compute a new measure, which has
nevertheless the same ￿ avour as ac(x), to study the volatility of model variables; I check whether
the adjustment in margins a⁄ects it, stressing the di⁄erence between normal adjustments and
those characterized by the uncertainty that may occasionally wreck the borrowing relationships
between debtors and creditors. In line with (30), a simple way to capture this type of uncertainty











be the volatility ratio as the average ratio between the standard deviations computed, for each
variable of interest, under binding constraints and non-binding constraints. vr(x) = 1 only if
the variable x is as volatile in the ￿rst case as in the second case.
The results for this exercise are in Table 7. The table shows that, in the model of this
paper (columns di⁄erent from the ￿rst one), vr(x) is below 1 for the most of the variables,
generally for the foreign country variables. Again, risk sharing is bene￿cial when international
traders can diversify their secured liabilities across countries, as the bonds they sale have strong
hedging properties against terms of trade shocks. In contrast, at home the strength of collateral
constraints produces similar e⁄ects as in closed economy. It follows that, while variables not
a⁄ected by the terms of trade are not subject to ampli￿cation e⁄ects30, they cannot seemingly
bene￿t from international diversi￿cations (i.e., home country variables tend to have vr(x) = 1).
This is true for the loss-spiral-only version of the model (column 2), the model with adjusting
haircuts (column 3) and the model in which the covariance matrix is expanded with either shocks
to the debt-to-asset ratios or with investment shocks (columns 4-5).
30See again Table 6.
44Yet, from another viewpoint, the addition of "￿t;"￿￿t to the standard productivity shocks is
a somewhat more singular case. As column 4 indicates, vr(x) is higher than in other versions of
the model (columns 2, 3 and 5) for almost all the variables. The only exceptions are the equity
prices, qe
Ht;qe
Ft, and the terms of trade, pFt. The ￿rst two prices bene￿t from the cross-country
positions in equity holdings; the third price creates ampli￿cation but its riskiness is neutralized
for by the debt portfolio. But apart from these hedging properties of optimal portfolio positions,
all the other variables turn out to incorporate the additional risk generated by the shocks to
the debt-to-asset ratios. In spite of the fact that through ￿nancial integration binding collateral
constraints do not amplify economic cycles at home, home country borrowing (BA
Ht;RHt) and
capital (￿A
Ht) tend now to be more volatile under binding constraints than under non-binding
constraints. Interest rates (RHt;RFt) have higher volatility ratios than in other versions of
the model, pointing out that the adjustment in haircuts renders debt costs more sensitive to
innovations. The shocks to the haircuts a⁄ect the volatility of these two variables so much that
their volatility ratios are more than twice as large as in the case of other model speci￿cations.
The previous section shows in fact that the risk premia paid on debt (the GPs) are very sensitive
to the haircut adjustment.
These results show that the time-variation in haircuts does not have quantitative implications
under normal business cycle ￿ uctuations. Under these conditions, there is ampli￿cation in the
two-country economy if collateral constraints bind, for borrowing from foreigners means facing
the additional real exchange rate risk, as one would intuitively expect. Seemingly, the market
value of collateral is a⁄ected by valuation e⁄ects on foreign assets. However, provided that
traders can borrow from foreign lenders, this ampli￿cation is counterbalanced by the international
diversi￿cation of risk. Domestically, the economy faces the opposite situation: domestic variables
are not a⁄ected by the ampli￿cation typical of collateral constraints in closed economy, but they
can neither show volatility gains that can be produced only by the international diversi￿cation
of the risk of margin calls. All in all, the e⁄ects of risk sharing can be both positive and negative:
non-ampli￿ed ￿ uctuations with risk, for home country variables; ampli￿cation but reduced risk,
for the foreign country variables. In this regard, time-varying margins do not have any negative
e⁄ects: it is even the case that its spur in favour of market discipline results in a slightly positive
outcome: for instance, that of reducing the volatility ratio of ￿A
Ht from 1.23 (loss-spiral-only case
in column 2, Table7) to 1.03 (full model in column 3, same table).
Fluctuating margins can show signs of dynamics similar to the margin spirals discussed by
Brunnermeier (2009) only in one case: when the normal economic ￿ uctuations are accompanied
by shocks to debt-to-asset ratios. This is proper of these shocks. As column 5 of Table 7 shows,
45investment shocks can only increase the volatility of investment spending, leaving borrowing
largely unchanged. In contrast, shocks to the debt-to-asset ratios have a much more generalized
and pronounced e⁄ect on model variables. This complies with recent ￿ndings that attribute
an important role to ￿nancial shocks in explaining the observed macroeconomic volatility (Jer-
mann and Qadrini, 2011): in this model, ￿nancial shocks can create additional risk through
the adjustment in the size of the collateral (and, thus, of the loan) in line with changes in the
borrower-speci￿c credit risk. This type of explanation seems close to Geanakoplos￿perspective,
recalled at the beginning of this section. Note however that it depends on my choice for mod-
elling the shocks to ￿t;￿￿
t. I scale these shocks so that they can retrieve shocks to the haircuts,
which are the variables of interest for the satisfaction of (15￿ ). The simple modelling device I
use for this purpose is the (inverse of) the stady state debt-to-capital ratio of borrowers, ￿ m=￿ ￿31.
Without this measure for initial leverage, shocks to ￿t;￿￿
t cannot be interpreted as haircut shocks
and tend to have quantitatively smaller e⁄ects on the volatility of borrowing and interest rates
(column 6, Table 7).
8 Conclusions
I develop a two-country portfolio model with binding collateral constraints, which is suitable
to study the e⁄ects of both the cross-border diversi￿cation of secured debt and the adjustment
of haircuts to country-speci￿c shocks. The parameters governing the reaction of haircuts are
estimated via SMM, using ￿nancial and macroeconomic data of major OECD countries.
The model is capable to reproduce the empirical tendency of countries to display home equity
bias and a short position in bonds. Yet, bonds here are not generic but speci￿c, in the sense
that they are constrained by collateral. Although collateral represent a limit to borrowing,
the diversi￿cation of secured short position across countries has nice hedging properties against
￿ uctuations in the terms of trade. Consequently, the terms of trade risk is more easily shared
when collateral limits bind than when not. On the other hand, binding constraints generate
the usual ampli￿cation issues, rightly through the terms of trade. It seems in fact that, in an
integrated world, ampli￿cation and volatility are connected to changes in the real exchange rate.
In this type of environment, the transmission mechanism discovered by Devereux and Yetman
(2010) works in a complex way. Originally thought to be the reaction of borrowing limits to the
diversi￿cation of collateral assets, here this transmission mechanism works through the asset side
as well as through the liability side of investors￿balance-sheets. In the ￿rst periods after a shock,
31See also Adrian and Shin (2008) and various of their other works.
46both home and foreign economies react by more, while there is a correction in the longer horizon.
These dynamics are proper of loss spirals with adjustment in haircuts, implying the transmission
mechanism incorporates the typical features that have characterized the evolution of the banking
sectors around the world. Generally, this combination leads to stabilizing haircuts, but there is
a case in which shocks to haircuts may add to the risk of the normal business cycle, generating a
sort of margin spiral. This happens when, accounting for the initial leverage of the representative
investor, the dynamics of the system are driven by both productivity and haircut shocks.
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50A Appendix
A.1 Conditions for zero-order portfolios
The solution for the equity portfolio developed by DY is based on the allocation of capital across
sectors. Since my model embeds the framework proposed by DY, the steady state allocation of capital
is an important condition also here. Moreover, the portfolio diversi￿cation between home and foreign
liabilities is, by construction, based on the collateral constraint. Through this channel, the allocation
of capital leads to another steady state condition. In this appendix, I brie￿ y derive both conditions.








1 + ￿ cP￿￿￿
. Then, from (24), the gross rate of interest is










Plugging the GP into (20)-(21), I ￿nd the return on equity:






Being it the active investors￿pricing of capital, this equation can be combined with passive investors￿
pricing of capital (25) as well as with the clearing condition (34). Given the distortion in pricing caused
by collateral constraints (Aiyagari and Gertler, 1999), this step allows DY obtain a necessary condition
for the diversi￿cation between home and foreign equities.
Condition 1. By de￿nition, equities are in positive net-supply. So the cross-country diversi￿cation
of the capital used to produce ￿nal goods, n￿ ￿A, is conditional on the allocation of domestic capital across














A + (1 ￿ n)￿ k
P = 1
with
￿ ￿A= ￿ k
A+￿ k
￿A
51Under binding constraints, I can combine this result with (15) in order to obtain the total size of the
collateral pledged by active investors to passive investors. This identi￿es the necessary condition to
determine the diversi￿cation between home and foreign liabilities.
Condition 2. From active investors￿ viewpoint, secured bonds behave like assets that are in
positive net supply. The per-capita amount of secured bonds depends on the volume of collateral and
the steady state value of all asset prices:
￿ BA=







A.2 The SMM estimation
I consider my OECD sample of 12 countries. My target is to estimate on the basis of cross-country
averages, given an unbalanced panel and the longest possible time series, I have to make the following
two choices: 1) I set T = 35 and consider the period 1975-2010; 2) I drop Belgium and Germany.
My approach is based on a logic which combines various existing studies. Iacoviello (2005) obtains
an empirical measure of the e⁄ects of loan-to-value ratios by matching impulse response functions.
Michaelides and Ng (2000) applying simulation estimators to the speculative storage model, ￿nd that a
set of moments which includes the skewness and the kurtosis of commodity prices performs better than
a set of moments that does not. In empirical ￿nance, the use of GARCH models for the conditional
variance of log-returns on assets is the standard way to go. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) adopt
a similar approach assuming that the dynamics of economic fundamentals follow an ARCH process,
which thus in￿ uence the margin set by lenders.
On the basis of these types of studies and various attempts, I choose to proxy ￿￿t;￿￿￿t with an AR(1)
process for the log-return on local stock market indices and to match the following four moments: 1)
the home consumption-output correlation; 2) the home stock price-output correlation; 3) the skewness
of equity returns; 4) the kurtosis of equity returns. In this way, I do not impose GARCH e⁄ects from
the very beginning yet I control, simultaneously, for their presence as well as for the suitability of the
model to reproduce them. Indeed, there is no suitable a priori assumption on the possibility to ￿nd the
notorious volatility clustering in aggregate data and on whether the theoretical model can capture it.
52Then, the variables involved in the estimation and corresponding data series are reported below:
Var. De￿nition in model Data
YH H country output of ￿nal goods GDP at current market prices
c aggregate consumption of ￿nal goods at H Private ￿nal consumption expenditures
qe
H H country equity price Share prices, Index
where the data are taken from the OECD Stat Extracts database, as in other instances of the calibration.
Let Mt ( ) be the vector of moments computed on the simulated time-series and Md
t that of
empirical moments. Then, given the results in Du¢ e and Singleton (1993), my estimation problem can
be described as follows:
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Note that the optimal weighting matrix, WT, coincides with the empirical covariance matrix, ￿
￿1
0 , where
the approximation is largely satis￿ed for ￿ ! 1. ￿
￿1
0 is computed with the Newey-West estimator.
The derivatives D = E@Mt ( )=@  are computed computed numerically as the time-mean of two-sided
di⁄erences. The only caveat of this numerical approximation is that I minimize with a grid search, a
"derivative-free" method. As a result, for sure I cannot evaluate di⁄erences between points that exceed
the grid, and the shape of the criterion function, GT ( )
0 WTGT ( ), should be replicated at best.
To take this into account, I expand my grid as much as possible (unfortunately, losing in terms of
computational speed), and I account for the direction of the grid along which I compute the derivative.
Grid search: a justification. The model at hand does not only involve solving for the ￿rst-
order behavior of model variables, but also for an endogenous portfolio allocation. In this sense, it is
not obvious to cast the model into a unique function to supply to pre-existing optimization procedures.
I thus refrain from in￿ uencing the core part of the paper, the computation of equilibrium portfolios,
and rely more heavily on optimization procedures which can be rather easily programmed, namely, grid
53search and ascent gradient. But since the latter was not performing better than the former and entailed
more "baby-sitting", I have eventually opted for the grid search.
Intuitively, the grid search is good enough for my purpose, because the estimation of   or  
￿ is
simpli￿ed by the fact that   +  ￿2[0; ￿ ￿]. The only di¢ culty is that making just one parameter vary
(or the two varying simultaneously in opposite directions) does not allow to ￿nd an optimum. So the
strategy I follow is to start with an equal range for both parameters which implies   +  ￿< ￿ ￿ , to
increase this range progressively until   +  ￿= ￿ ￿, estimating at each iteration. In such a way, I ￿nd an
interior and signi￿cant optimum (Figure 4), using a large grid for both   and  
￿. The drawack of such
large grids is that the required computational time increases substantially.
54Table 1. Calibrated coe¢ cients, except margin setting
Parameter Description Value
from previous studies
n number of constrained investors 0.5
￿ discount factor parameter 0.022
￿ share of home goods in consumption 0.72
￿ elasticity of substitution in consumption 0.85
￿I share of home goods in investment 0.75
￿I elasticity of substitution in investment 0.9
￿ CRRA 2
￿ capital share in income 0.4
z ￿xed productivity in backyard production 1
￿ degree of homogeneity in backyard sector 0.1
from UK, US (rates) and OECD (shocks) data
R gross rate of interest 1.0418
￿ ￿=￿
A ￿
￿ cA￿￿￿ guarantee premium 0.001134
￿2
A TFP shock: volatility 0.0152
￿2
￿ investment shock: volatility 0.0172
￿A TFP shock: persistence 0.81
￿￿ investment shock: persistence 0.85
￿("At;"A￿t) TFP shocks: cross-country correlation 0.45
￿("￿t;"￿￿t) investment shocks: cross-country correlation 0.26
55Table 2. Calibrating the steady state ￿
chosen strategy: OECD data on lenders
Passive investors Shares-to-Assets Ratio
￿ qe￿ kP=(￿ qe￿ kP￿￿ qb ￿ BP) Model implied ￿ ￿
Investment funds 0.49 -
Insurance corporations and pension funds 0.42 -
Model 0.45 0.31
alternative strategy: US data on borrowers
Debt-to-Assets Ratio: ￿ ￿
Active investors Total assets Assets (No household/public)
Shadow banks1 0.351 0.293
Commercial banks - 0.224
Commercial banks (no mutual funds shares) - 0.221
Source: Institutional Investor Statistics, OECD database; Flow of Funds Accounts of the U.S.,
Federal Reserve Statistics.
1 Shadow banks are ￿nance companies, funding corporations, issuers of ABCP and security
broker-dealers.






OIR test Moments to match
￿(ct;Y t) 3 ￿(qe
Ht;Y t) Skew(rHt) Kurt(rHt)
data: T = 35 - - - 0.9241 0.7152 -0.7260 2.6880
SMM: ￿ = 10 0:1233yyy
0:0020
0.1513 0.1204 0.6792 0.6236 0.0050 2.7683
SMM: ￿ = 20 0:1215yyy
0:0049
0.1499 0.1381 0.7229 0.6783 -0.0556 2.7433
SMM: ￿ = 30 0:1260yyy
0:0034
0.1488 0.1458 0.7021 0.6676 -0.0733 2.5614
chosen parametrization




drivers 0.126 0.185 shock 0.37 0.032 0.64 0
1 yyy means that the con￿dence level is p < 0:001.
2 i = A;￿, meaning that the shock to ￿ is uncorrelated with other types of shocks.
3 In the model, ct is (country H) consumption of ￿nal goods only, as backyard production is a
















56Table 4. Portfolios at market prices and in terms of total output
Home Foreign Fin. wealth
Equity Bond Equity Bond
investors
Home passive 0.80 0.78 - 0.21 1.79
Home active 1.88 -0.78 1.30 -0.21 2.19
Foreign passive - 0.21 0.80 0.78 1.79
Foreign active 1.30 -0.21 1.88 -0.78 2.19
Market clearing 3.98 0 3.98 0 7.96
sectors
Home backyard: NT 0.80 0.99 - - 1.79
Home ￿nal goods: T 3.18 -0.99 - - 2.19
Foreign backyard: NT - - 0.80 0.99 1.79
Foreign ￿nal goods: T - - 3.18 -0.99 2.19
cross-border trading
Home assets 1.30 0.21 - - 1.51
Foreign assets - - 1.30 0.21 1.51
Table 5. Sensitivity: home bias and implied e⁄ect of collateral on credit risk
Fin. home bias % Credit risk
Value used Equity Secured debt Local c. Foreign c.
Baseline calibration - 59.1 78.8 0.213 0.450
sensitivity analysis
Greater home bias in consumption ￿ = 0:82 59.8 79.8 0.211 0.457
Greater substitutability in consumption ￿ = 1:05 56.9 94.9 0.221 0.427
Greater home bias in investment ￿I= 0:85 69.0 88.9 0.183 0.593
Greater substitutability in investment ￿I= 1:1 58.9 79.8 0.214 0.448
Greater leverage ￿ ￿ = 0:41 59.1 92.4 0.282 0.595
Inverted role of prices in credit risk   = 0:181 59.1 78.8 0.311 0.301
Note: In terms of the results in Table 4, the de￿nitions in the table at hand are as follows:
a) local bias in asset i =
H (F) active investors￿ownership of H (F) asset i
stock of asset i used by H (F) ￿nal goods sector , where i = equity, bond
b) e⁄ect of local collateral on domestic investors￿creditworthiness =
 
local equity bias
c) e⁄ect of foreign collateral on domestic investors￿creditworthiness =
 ￿
1 - local equity bias
57Table 6. Binding costraints: deleveraging and ampli￿cation
Shocks
per country "At "At;"￿t "At;"￿t










































































































i price of equity i
￿A




i per-capita debt stock, expressed in terms of good i
Ri rate of interest on debt issued in terms of country i good
pF foreign good price
58Table 7. Unexpected tightening: margin spirals and risk
Shocks
per country "At "At;"￿t "At;"￿t "At;"￿t
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i per-capita debt stock, expressed in terms of good i
Ri rate of interest on debt issued in terms of country i good
pF foreign good price
59Figure 1. External positions in all currencies (share of world GDP)
























Loans Deposits with Banks
Source: BIS Locational banking statistics; The World Bank WDI
Note: The group of European countries is formed by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
The group of Anglo-Saxon countries is made by Australia, Canada, Japan, U.K., U.S.
60Figure 2. Financial transactions in Devereux and Yetman (2010)
61Figure 3. Financial transactions in the model herewith
62Figure 4. Determination of coe¢ cient(s) with the SMM algorithm (case with ￿ = 30)
63Figure 5. Responses to home productivity shocks: loss spirals with adjusting haircuts
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64Figure 6. Responses to home productivity shocks: loss spirals without adjusting haircuts
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65Figure 7. Home productivity shocks: the di⁄erential e⁄ect of adjusting haircuts
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66Figure 8. Decomposing the contribution of haircuts: Impact multipliers
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Note:  ; 
￿ simultaneously increase in their respective ranges, with 23 steps each:   2[0;0:126];
 
￿2[0;0:185]. The number of steps is on the x-axis.
67Figure 9. Decomposing the contribution of haircuts: Cumulative multipliers, lags 1-5
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Note:  ; 
￿ simultaneously increase in their respective ranges, with 23 steps each:   2[0;0:126];
 
￿2[0;0:185]. The number of steps is on the x-axis.
68Figure 10. Pledging collateral, a counterfactual: from ￿nancial integration to autarky
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Note: Complete ￿nancial integration is de￿ned as   =  ￿= ￿ ￿=2 and autarky as   = ￿ ￿; ￿= 0.
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